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ABSTRACT 
Optimism has been a favourite topic of research in positive psychology. 
Optimism, defined as a generalized positive expectancy for the future, is generally 
regarded as a positive trait.  However, despite positive findings for optimism, some 
researchers have suggested that optimism is not beneficial in all contexts. Alternatives to 
optimism have been proposed, including flexible optimism (Seligman, 1991; Forgeard & 
Seligman, 2012) and cautious optimism (Wallston, 1994). While such criticism of 
optimism lacks substantial empirical support, there are a few studies that appear to 
support these contentions. Previous research suggests that optimism is associated with 
maladaptive persistence in gambling (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004) and poorer health 
(de Ridder, Schreurs, & Bensing, 2000).  Furthermore, research on defensive pessimism 
and unrealistic optimism supports the notion of a “dark side” of optimism.  
A new construct is proposed to reconcile these divergent findings: expectancy 
flexibility. Expectancy flexibility is defined as the ability to change one’s expectations of 
the future in response to contextual cues. It was hypothesized that expectancy flexibility 
would moderate or mediate the associations between optimism and various outcomes.  
Four studies were conducted to validate the Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS), 
an instrument developed to measure expectancy flexibility. The first two studies were 
used to develop a scale with good internal consistency reliability, a low correlation with 
optimism (to provide discriminant validity), and a moderate correlation with theoretically 
related constructs (to provide convergent validity). The purpose of the third study was to 
test whether shifts in expectations actually occur in response to negative feedback, and 
whether these shifts were predicted by scores on the EFS. The fourth study tested 
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whether the EFS was associated with constructs believed to be outcomes, including 
preventive health behaviours, academic success, and problem gambling. In all four 
studies, participants were undergraduate students who were recruited through a 
participant pool at a Canadian university. The EFS and several other self-report 
questionnaires were completed by participants via an online platform.  
The findings of Study 1 and Study 2 supported the reliability and validity of the 
EFS. Internal consistency reliability was in the acceptable range (α > 0.70). Supporting 
the scale’s convergent validity, expectancy flexibility was associated with related 
measures like defensive pessimism and cognitive flexibility. Weak and non-significant 
correlations were found between expectancy flexibility and optimism, locus of control, 
and coping flexibility, supporting the scale’s discriminant validity.  
The findings of Study 3 partially supported the hypothesis that expectancy 
flexibility is associated with shifts in expectations. In the gambling scenario, losses were 
generally associated with reduced expectations, while gains were associated with no 
change or slight increases in gambling expectations. This pattern of findings was not 
evident in the academic scenario, where disappointing exam results did not produce a 
negative shift in expectations. 
In Study 4, expectancy flexibility was positively associated with academic 
approach coping, social health, general academic skills, and confidence; it was negatively 
related to substance use and problem gambling. Analysis of the qualitative questions 
generally supported the hypothesis that expectancy flexibility is associated with shifts in 
expectations. However, the moderational and mediational models were not supported. 
Overall, the results provide support for the validity of the flexible optimism construct. 
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Introduction 
Optimism: Is the Conceptual Glass Half Empty (Or Half Full)? 
Overview 
 The field of positive psychology has attempted to refocus research on what is 
right with people, rather than what is wrong. One of the most extensively studied topics 
in positive psychology is that of optimism. Optimism has usually been defined as a trait 
that characterizes individuals who hold positive expectations for the future (Scheier & 
Carver, 1985). More than three decades of empirical research have documented the 
purported benefits of optimism. Optimism has been associated with positive mood, 
perseverance, achievement, and good physical health (Peterson, 2000) and is considered 
an important ingredient for achieving a happy and successful life (Seligman, 1991; 
Seligman, 2011). 
Despite strong evidence for the apparent advantages of optimism, some 
researchers have suggested that optimism is not beneficial in all contexts. While a few 
published studies support their claims, their criticism of optimism currently lacks 
substantial empirical support. One purpose of this research study is to consider a variety 
of contexts wherein the costs and benefits of pessimism and optimism vary and to find an 
optimal balance between the two extremes. Put another way, when it comes to optimism, 
is it possible to have too much of a good thing? 
Some psychologists (e.g., Held, 2002; Lazarus, 2003) have expressed concerns 
about the potential devolvement of positive psychology into a “fad science” of positive 
thinking. In reaction to this criticism, there has been a call (McNulty & Fincham, 2012) 
for a more contextual view of psychological processes in positive psychology. McNulty 
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and Fincham (2012) note that “psychological traits and processes are not inherently 
positive or negative; instead, whether psychological characteristics promote or undermine 
well-being depends on the context in which they operate” (p. 101). This quote suggests 
two things. First, there ought to be more attention paid to context in research in positive 
psychology. Second, the degree of benefit of a personality trait may be thought of as a 
function of an interaction between the trait and the context. 
In contrast to the recent consensus regarding the beneficial nature of optimism, 
early literary references to optimism were less than positive. Peterson (2000, p. 44) notes 
that “a positive psychology should not hold up Dr. Pangloss or Pollyanna as role 
models”. This statement refers to two fictional caricatures of positive thinking that have 
exemplified negative stereotypes about optimists for more than a century. In Candide, 
Voltaire (1759) describes an overly-optimistic character named Dr. Pangloss, who 
believes that “everything is for the best and that this is the best of all possible worlds” (a 
satire on the optimistic views of Voltaire’s contemporary, the philosopher Leibniz). 
Similarly, Porter’s (1913) story of the permanently positive Pollyanna and her “glad 
game” (which involved turning every misfortune into a blessing to maintain a façade of 
vapid cheerfulness) has been used to paint optimists as being hopelessly naïve or living in 
a massive state of denial.  
Attitudes toward optimism in the psychological community in the twentieth 
century were similarly skeptical. Freud (1928/2012) believed that optimism was a 
neurotic delusion, and represented a fundamental denial of reality. Meanwhile, the 
psychiatric establishment adopted a disease model of psychopathology primarily focused 
on what was wrong with individuals (Maddux, 2002). For many years, optimism was 
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generally ignored, and research instead focused on extreme pessimism in the form of 
hopelessness (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974).   
It was not until the 1980s that research on optimism as a positive personality trait 
began (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and optimism research has flourished ever since. Much 
of this research can be attributed to the Zeitgeist of the positive psychology movement, 
which started as a reaction to deficit-based research (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2000). Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi defined positive psychology as being about valued 
subjective experiences, positive individual traits, and civic virtues. This focus on what is 
right with people, rather than what is wrong, is a striking departure from past research 
and has filled a large gap in the research literature. As stated by Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi (2000), “This almost exclusive attention to pathology neglects the 
fulfilled individual and the thriving community” (p. 5).  
Today, optimism is considered a vital component of well-being. Research on 
optimism has spurred the development of interventions, such as the Best Possible Self 
Intervention (King, 2001; Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts, 2011), that are designed to make 
people more optimistic. However, the idea of promulgating optimism is not new, and has 
long been the mainstay of self-help authors. From the Power of Positive Thinking (Peale, 
1956) to more recent books like The Secret (Byrne, 2008), the promotion of positive 
thinking has created a thriving (and lucrative) industry. Even some well-respected 
academic researchers (e.g., Lyubomirsky, 2007; Seligman, 2002) have joined the self-
help bandwagon, though their books are more firmly grounded in psychological research.  
But is optimism as beneficial as its advocates claim? In a scathing critique entitled 
Bright-Sided, Ehrenreich (2009) claims that the “relentless” promotion of positive 
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thinking by self-help authors, positive psychologists, business executives, political 
leaders and others has done more harm than good, causing everything from widespread 
unhappiness to the Iraq War to the stock market collapse of 2008. Given these potential 
negative consequences, researchers ought to take heed and investigate whether such 
deleterious effects of optimism do exist. The potential for negative side effects also calls 
into question the wisdom of optimism-promoting interventions. It would do no good to 
increase optimism at the expense of overall well-being. 
Definitions of Optimism and Pessimism. Before discussing the research 
literature on optimism, it is necessary to define what optimism is. This is not simple, as 
there are several competing definitions of optimism and pessimism in the research 
literature. Distinguishing between different definitions of optimism is important because 
these definitions of optimism are only modestly associated with one another (e.g., 
Peterson & Vaidya, 2001) and thus cannot be considered interchangeable. Four of these 
definitions are reviewed: dispositional optimism, optimistic explanatory style, unrealistic 
optimism, and defensive pessimism. 
Perhaps the most common conceptualization of optimism is that of dispositional 
optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Of the four operationalizations of the optimism 
construct, dispositional optimism is probably the most similar to the lay usage of the term 
(Norem, 2002). Dispositional optimism is defined as a generalized positive outcome 
expectancy (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Stated another way, optimists anticipate that good 
things (positive) will happen (outcomes) in the future (expectancies). Additionally, 
dispositional optimism is generalizable; that is, it is applicable to a range of situations and 
is stable over time (Carver & Scheier, 2014).  Dispositional optimism is usually 
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conceptualized as a bipolar construct, with low levels of dispositional optimism called 
dispositional pessimism. It is related to constructs like hope and self-efficacy, which also 
involve positive outcome expectancies, but is not confounded by agency or self-
confidence (Carver & Scheier, 2014).   
Dispositional optimism is measured using a brief self-report scale known as the 
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R), which was developed by Scheier, Carver, and 
Bridges (1994) as a modification of the earlier Life Orientation Test (Scheier & Carver, 
1985). The LOT-R consists of three items that assess optimism and three reversed-scored 
items that assess pessimism. Traditionally, the LOT-R is treated as a unidimensional 
measure; however, some authors (Kubzansky, Kubzansky, & Maselko, 2004; Marshall, 
Wortman, Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers, 1992) have suggested that it is better to treat the 
dispositional optimism and pessimism items as separate subscales. 
Another conceptualization of optimism is that of optimistic explanatory style, 
which was based on Seligman’s learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1972) and Beck’s 
cognitive triad (Beck, 1967). According to this view, optimism is how individuals explain 
the causes of bad events. People employing an optimistic explanatory style make 
unstable, specific, and external attributions for past negative events (Peterson, 2000). 
When negative events occur, optimists consider them temporary, particular to that 
situation, and due to someone else’s actions. Pessimists, on the other hand, explain 
negative events as having stable, global, and internal causes. Stated differently, when bad 
things occur, pessimists consider them to be long-lasting, pervasive, and due to their own 
actions (justified or not). Optimistic explanatory style is weakly correlated with 
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dispositional optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1992), suggesting that the two constructs are 
distinctly different, despite the similarity of name. 
Explanatory style is usually measured using either the Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) or the Content Analysis of Verbatim 
Explanations (CAVE; Peterson, Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1992). The ASQ 
presents respondents with a series of hypothetical negative events. Participants are asked 
to provide the most likely cause of the event, and rate the degree to which they perceive 
the cause as internal, stable, and global (Peterson, 2000). In contrast, the CAVE is a 
qualitative tool that can be used to code written causal explanations for events. 
Researchers score the CAVE by extracting respondents’ explanations for bad events and 
rating them as being either internal or external, stable or unstable, and global or specific 
(Peterson et al., 1992).  
Yet another view of optimism is that of unrealistic optimism, which is sometimes 
called optimistic bias or comparative optimism (Shepperd, Waters, Weinstein, & Klein, 
2015; Weinstein, 1980). In contrast to dispositional optimism, unrealistic optimism is a 
cognitive bias rather than a trait (Schwarzer, 1994). Unrealistic optimists perceive 
themselves as being at lower risk of experiencing negative life events in the future 
relative to other people. Thus, unrealistic optimism is influenced by social comparison 
processes (Klein & Weinstein, 1997). 
Unrealistic optimism is often measured by administering a scale developed by 
Weinstein (1980) that assesses comparative risk judgments. This scale lists 18 positive 
and 24 negative life events. Respondents are asked to judge the likelihood that these 
events will happen to them relative to their peers (i.e., a typical person of the same age 
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and sex as the respondent). According to the unrealistic optimism perspective, those who 
think that positive events are more likely to happen to themselves and negative events are 
less likely to happen to themselves are considered unrealistic optimists. 
A fourth type of optimism is known as defensive pessimism (its opposite is called 
strategic optimism, though this term is not often used). Defensive pessimism is defined as 
a strategy where people set their own expectations low in an effort to avoid feelings of 
disappointment after failure or to increase their likelihood of a positive outcome in a 
performance situation (Norem & Cantor, 1986a). Defensive pessimists differ from their 
dispositional pessimist counterparts in that they deliberately set their expectations low in 
an effort to cope with anxiety. For example, defensive pessimists differ from depressed 
individuals (who are similar to dispositional pessimists) in that they exhibit less avoidant 
coping, less residual anxiety, and less rumination after stressful events (Showers & 
Ruben, 1990). By setting their expectations low, defensive pessimists harness their 
anxiety and convert it into motivation to prevent the negative outcome they anticipate.  
Defensive pessimism is usually measured using the Defensive Pessimism 
Questionnaire (Norem, 2001). The DPQ is a self-report measure that assesses one’s level 
of defensive pessimism. It has typically been used in academic contexts to assess 
students’ use of defensive pessimism (e.g., Seginer, 2000), but the scale has also been 
used in health (Chang & Sivam, 2004) and athletics (Wilson, Raglin, & Pritchard, 2002).  
Optimism is related conceptually to hope (Snyder, Harris & Anderson, 1991) and 
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Prentice-Dunn, Jacobs, & 
Rogers, 1982). Optimism, hope, and self-efficacy share positive expectations for the 
future. They are generally moderately correlated with one another, with a typical 
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correlation of about .50 (Alarcon, Bowling, & Khazon, 2013).  However, both hope and 
self-efficacy are conceptually distinct from each other and from optimism (Magaletta & 
Oliver, 1999). Briefly, hope is made up of two components: agency (a belief that one will 
meet goals in the future) and pathways (the belief that one will be able to generate 
successful plans to meet those goals). Optimism is similar to the pathways component of 
hope; both pertain to expectancies about outcomes. However, the pathways component of 
hope refers only to outcomes obtained by oneself; optimism also includes expectancies 
about outcomes obtained through others and forces outside oneself. Similarly, self-
efficacy refers to one’s belief in one’s ability to perform a specific behavior that will 
produce a desired outcome. Self-efficacy is similar to the agency component of hope; 
both pertain to expectancies about one’s ability to perform a behaviour. In contrast, most 
definitions of optimism lack this belief in one’s capability.  
 This variety of definitions suggests that there is no conclusive operationalization 
of optimism or pessimism. Whereas the definitions have some overlap, they appear to 
measure distinct constructs. Because of the diversity of definitions, studies using different 
operationalizations of optimism ought to be considered separately, rather than pooled 
together. This is important because different operationalizations of optimism often have 
different correlates. The lack of a unitary definition is one of the challenges that confronts 
optimism researchers. 
Current Skepticism of Optimism. One might expect that positive psychologists 
would have an uncritically favourable view of optimism. Surprisingly, some of the most 
prominent researchers in positive psychology have been among optimism’s biggest 
skeptics. For example, Peterson (2000) noted: “Optimism in some circumstances can 
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have drawbacks and costs, although researchers rarely look for these qualifying 
conditions.” (p. 44). Even Martin Seligman, often called the father of positive 
psychology, has expressed skepticism of optimism. In the closing words to Learned 
Optimism, Seligman (1991) said that optimism is not always the answer to every 
situation: “What we want is not blind optimism but flexible optimism—optimism with its 
eyes open. We must be able to use pessimism’s keen sense of reality when we need it” (p. 
292).  Forgeard and Seligman (2012) speculated that optimism is the best strategy in most 
circumstances because it allows individuals to pursue their goals, be persistent, and be 
open to opportunities. However, Seligman thinks that pessimism is the better strategy 
when danger is near because pessimism can help re-direct one’s actions (similar 
sentiments were expressed previously by Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). In addition, 
pessimism may cushion the effects of disappointment if it seems that a desirable goal 
cannot be achieved. Thus, Seligman advocates for a careful balance of optimism and 
pessimism.  
Seligman is not the only researcher who has proposed a re-examination of the 
optimism construct. In a brief commentary, Wallston (1994) speculated that there are two 
kinds of optimists: cautious optimists and cockeyed optimists. These two types of 
optimists, he describes, differ in terms of the certainty of their optimism and this has 
consequences for their behaviour. Cautious optimists are fairly certain that favourable 
outcomes will occur, while cockeyed optimists are absolutely certain that everything will 
work out for the best. Similarly, Wallston speculates that while cautious optimists engage 
in actions that they think will produce positive outcomes and ward off negative outcomes, 
cockeyed optimists do not engage in actions that could foster positive outcomes or 
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prevent negative outcomes. Because of this, Wallston believes that cockeyed optimism is 
potentially hazardous to one’s health because these optimists are less likely to engage in 
functional health behaviours than cautious optimists. Wallston’s conjecture is thought-
provoking; unfortunately, more than 20 years have passed since Wallston’s paper was 
published, and these speculations have remained untested.  
Correlates of optimism 
Review of meta-analyses. Several meta-analytic studies have been conducted to 
examine the association between optimism and psychological and physical well-being, 
coping, and other personality traits across studies. These meta-analyses have found that 
optimism is consistently associated with positive constructs, including better physical 
health ( Alarcon et al., 2013; Rasmussen et al., 2009), better psychological well-being 
(Alarcon et al., 2013; Andersson, 1996), and positive coping strategies (Andersson, 1996; 
Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). The hundreds of studies reviewed by these authors appear to 
support the idea that optimism is associated with beneficial outcomes. Or do they? 
A critical analysis of these findings suggests that optimism may not be as 
beneficial as some have claimed. In some cases, the effect sizes found in meta-analyses – 
while significant – were quite weak, especially for health-related variables. The effect 
sizes (as measured by r) of the associations between optimism and health indices 
(Rasmussen et al., 2009) and between optimism and various coping measures (Nes & 
Segerstrom, 2006) were generally in the 0.1-0.2 range. These findings suggest that only 
1-4% of the variance (as measured by r2) in health and coping measures can be attributed 
to optimism. The small magnitude of effects is unsurprising, given that many studies 
investigating associations between optimism and health and coping have found null 
 A Glass Half Full    11 
 
results (as reviewed previously). These small effect sizes suggest that optimism has a 
limited impact on health. This is sensible considering that one’s health can be affected by 
a multitude of factors, many outside of one’s control. To paraphrase Seligman (2011), 
being optimistic will not prevent a crane from falling on top of you! 
Other associations have been more robust, particularly between optimism and 
measures of personality constructs (such as the Big Five) and psychological well-being. 
But it is important to note that in cross-sectional studies these affective constructs cannot 
be considered outcomes and therefore should not be construed as “benefits” of optimism. 
Rather than demonstrating benefit, these findings merely establish that optimism is 
associated with theoretically related constructs. As Norem and Chang (2001) caution, 
relationships between optimism and affective variables are correlational, not causal. 
Constructs like happiness and anxiety are not necessarily the consequences of optimism. 
The reverse is equally plausible: perhaps being happy or less anxious results in having a 
more optimistic outlook. A third possibility is that optimism and other positive traits are 
correlated because they are subtly different facets of the same underlying trait of 
positivity. 
This begs the question: What are the consequences of optimism? Despite much 
research documenting optimism’s relationship to various constructs of psychological 
well-being, there has been comparatively little research into the bona fide outcomes of 
optimism. Theoretical work in personality research emphasizes the importance of 
examining the consequential outcomes of personality factors (Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 
2006). Ozer and Benet-Martinez stated that the practical importance of personality 
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variables is demonstrated by the degree to which they predict important individual, 
interpersonal, and social/institutional outcomes.  
Potential Outcomes of Optimism. Most of the research examining hypothesized 
effects of optimism has been conducted with constructs like physical health, coping, and 
academic success. It can be stated with some degree of confidence that these are the 
consequences of trait optimism, rather than contributing factors. The following sections 
will review some of the more prominent studies in these domains.  
Many studies on optimism have examined its association with subjective well-
being. Again, it is important to stress that because most of this research is correlational, it 
is dubious to infer causality. However, the temporal order of longitudinal studies 
strengthens inferences regarding a causal relationship. Several longitudinal studies have 
found that optimism is associated with later subjective well-being among people 
experiencing stressful health events (note that this does not imply that optimistic people 
are less likely to experience negative health outcomes, but instead relates to their 
adjustment to negative health events). These studies have found a positive relationship 
between optimism and later well-being (usually assessed by a lack of depression or 
distress, or better quality of life) in several contexts, including childbirth (Carver & 
Gaines, 1987), coronary artery bypass surgery (Fitzgerald, Tennen, Affleck, & Pransky, 
1993; Scheier et al., 1989), treatment for breast cancer (Carver et al., 1994; Carver, 
Smith, Antoni, Petronis, Weiss, & Derhagopian, 2005), and AIDS (Taylor et al., 1992). 
Although the results of these longitudinal studies are compelling, as they can more 
convincingly demonstrate (in comparison to studies employing a cross-sectional design) 
that optimism can predict subsequent subjective well-being, they are still not causal. 
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It is often claimed that optimists are healthier than pessimists, yet research on the 
health effects of optimism remains relatively scant. Research on optimism’s relationship 
with physical health has examined optimism’s effects on health outcomes in several 
disease contexts. Some of the more common contexts are heart disease, cancer, HIV, and 
immune function. Each context is reviewed below. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between optimism and heart 
disease. By examining odds ratios, dispositional optimism has been found to be 
associated with slower development of atherosclerosis (Matthews, Raikkonen, Sutton-
Tyrrell, & Kuller, 2004), lower risk of coronary heart disease (Tindle et al., 2009), and 
faster recovery from coronary bypass surgery (Scheier et al., 1989). However, Contrada 
et al. (2004) found no relationship between dispositional optimism and recovery from 
cardiac surgery. 
Several studies examining optimism’s association with cancer outcomes have 
yielded inconsistent results (Coyne & Tennen, 2010). While optimism was modestly 
related to lower mortality risk in head and neck cancer patients (Allison, Guichard, Fung, 
& Gilain, 2003) and general cancer mortality risk amongst Black women (Tindle et al., 
2009), optimism was not associated with mortality risk amongst lung cancer patients 
(Schofield et al., 2004). In addition, optimism was only associated with lower mortality 
risk among younger patients in a mixed cancer sample (Schulz, Bookwala, Knapp, 
Scheier, & Williamson, 1996).  
Optimism’s associations with HIV-related outcomes have also been mixed. 
Optimism has been associated with positive immunological indicators such as higher 
natural killer cell cytotoxicity and CD3+CD8+ cell percentage (Byrnes et al., 1998) and 
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lower HIV viral load (Milam, Richardson, Marks, Kemper, & McCutchan, 2004). 
However, other findings suggest that dispositional optimism had either a curvilinear 
relationship with CD4+ cell counts (Milam et al., 2004) or no relationship with CD4+ 
count (Tomakowsky, Lumley, Markowitz, & Frank, 2001). 
Optimists may also have better immune functioning under some circumstances. 
Research suggests that optimists generally have stronger immune responses than 
pessimists (e.g. Kohut, Cooper, Nickolaus, Russell, & Cunnick, 2002). However, 
optimists may have lower immune responses under high-stress conditions (Cohen et al., 
1999; Segerstrom, 2006). Other studies have found no association between optimism and 
immune functioning (Segerstrom, 2005; Segerstrom & Sephton, 2010). 
Research on coping has been similarly mixed. Optimism tends to be associated 
with healthier forms of coping, such as planning, active coping, and positive 
reinterpretation (Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986) and is inversely related to avoidant 
coping responses, such as denial, behavioural disengagement, mental disengagement, and 
using alcohol or drugs (Carver et al., 1989). However, pessimists scoring high on hope 
were found to be less likely to engage in passive coping than pessimists scoring low on 
hope (Lopes & Cunha, 2008), 
One specific kind of coping germane to health is that of preventive health 
behaviours. Preventive health behaviours are defined as activities undertaken by a person 
for the purpose of preventing disease (Kasl & Cobb, 1966). These behaviours are 
considered a form of approach-based coping (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010).  
Several studies have examined whether optimism is related to preventive health 
behaviours. For example, Friedman, Bruce, Webb, Weinberg, and Cooper (1993) found 
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that dispositional optimism was associated with a greater frequency of skin self-
examination. Other studies have found that optimists exhibited less delay in seeking 
treatment for breast cancer symptoms (Lauver & Tak, 1995) and were more likely to 
comply with prescribed health-promoting regimens (Shepperd, Maroto, & Pbert, 1996).  
However, previous studies have found no association between optimism and 
preventive behaviours relevant to hypertension (O’Brien, VanEgeren, and Mumby, 1995) 
or between optimism and intentions to use condoms or get tested for sexually transmitted 
infections (Zak-Place & Stern, 2004). In addition, health behaviours only partially 
mediated the relationship between optimism and physical health among elderly people 
(Steptoe, Wright, Kunz-Ebrecht, & Iliffe, 2006). Several studies have found that 
optimistic bias (a.k.a. ‘unrealistic optimism’) in risk perception may actually inhibit 
health-promoting behaviours (Schwarzer, 1994; Davidson & Prkachin, 1997).  
Evidence for optimism’s salubrious effects in academic contexts is scant and 
mixed. In a longitudinal study of first-year university students, optimism and grades were 
measured at several points in time (Gibbons, Blanton, Gerrard, Buunk, & Eggleston, 
2000). Compared to pessimistic students, optimistic students had higher grades in their 
first semester. This pattern (of optimists’ better performance compared to pessimists) 
continued for several semesters. A similar association was between LOT-R scores and 
GPA (Rand, 2009).  
However, Robbins, Spence, and Clark (1991) found no association between 
optimism and GPA, with a correlation close to zero for both males and females. In 
addition, Haynes et al. (2006) found that the final exam and GPA scores of highly 
optimistic students did not differ from that of less optimistic students. One could 
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speculate that these null findings mean that optimism is unrelated to academic 
performance. However, it could be argued that GPA (the usual measure of academic 
performance) may not be the best measure of student success, as some critics have 
suggested (Pritchard & Wilson, 2003; Robbins, Lauver, Le, Davis, Langley, & Carlstrom, 
2004). These authors instead propose that social and psychological factors are better 
predictors of students’ graduation than GPA. 
The review above suggests that, on the balance, optimism is generally associated 
with positive outcomes. But caution is needed, as optimism does have some negative 
consequences. Optimism may “feel good” in the short run, but what about its long-term 
effects? Research on the consequences of unrealistic optimism suggests that this type of 
optimism could lead to taking unnecessary risks, failing to take health precautions, or 
being inadequately prepared for tasks (Shepperd, Pogge, & Howell, 2017). The 
consequences of dispositional optimism could be similarly negative, but these potentially 
negative consequences have yet to be explored, aside from a handful of studies with what 
could be termed “anomalous findings”. 
A Review of Anomalous Findings for Optimism 
Several studies have reported associations between optimism and undesirable 
outcomes and between pessimism and positive outcomes (the focus on these studies in 
this paper is a deliberate choice, and should not be construed as suggesting that these 
anomalous findings are commonplace in the literature). How can these anomalous 
findings be explained and reconciled with findings suggesting salubrious effects of 
optimism? As Norem and Chang (2001) put it, “there are potential benefits and costs to 
both optimism and pessimism that may be highly sensitive to context” (p. 348).  
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A systematic review of the literature yielded six studies. The studies reviewed 
found that dispositional optimism was associated with negative outcomes in three 
domains: risk-taking behaviour (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004; Hmieleski & Baron, 
2009), health (de Ridder, Schreurs, & Bensing, 2000; Milam, Richardson, Marks, 
Kemper, & McCutchan, 2004), and academics (Haynes, Ruthig, Perry, Stupnisky, & 
Hall, 2006; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010). Similarly, researchers have found that defensive 
pessimism is associated with positive outcomes, like performing preventative behaviours 
for SARS (Chang & Sivam, 2004) and passing more classes (Eronen, Nurmi, & Salmela-
Aro, 1998). These studies are summarized in the next section. 
Optimism and monetary risk-taking. Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004) 
examined the association between dispositional optimism and gambling in a sample of 
undergraduate psychology students. They measured optimism using the Life Orientation 
Test. The authors found that optimists were more likely than pessimists to: have positive 
gambling expectations, maintain these expectations following losses, indicate that 
winning money was a primary motivation for their gambling, and remember more near 
wins. They also found that pessimists reduced their betting and expectations after 
experiencing poor gaming performance. These findings demonstrate that traits such as 
optimism are not always useful and may actually be a liability in some contexts. This is 
because the optimist’s tendency to persist leads to continued effort (Carver & Scheier, 
2001). In contexts where the potential for loss is high (as in gambling), it appears that 
optimists’ persistence does them more harm than good. Gibson and Sanbonmatsu 
suggested that the tendency to ignore negative feedback causes optimistic gamblers to 
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continue gambling even as they continue to lose. Pessimists, on the other hand, 
disengaged from gambling when they began to accrue losses.  
This association between optimism and persistence in gambling despite failure is 
typical of people with gambling problems (Gilovich, 1983). Gibson and Sanbonmatsu 
attributed this vulnerability to optimists’ perseverance and illusion of control (the belief 
that one will win through effort), which causes them to continue to gambling even after 
losing. Normally, persistence is beneficial (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 
2007), but in a gambling context it can have negative effects. Gibson and Sanbonmatsu 
speculated that optimists continue to gamble because they hold onto the optimistic belief 
that their luck will turn around. Previous studies have found that having a belief that one 
will win at gambling because of good luck or through persistence is related to problem 
gambling (Gilovich, 1983; Wohl & Enzle, 2003). Similarly, having a belief in good luck 
is related to optimism (Day & Maltby, 2003). 
Entrepreneurship, like gambling, is another context that involves monetary risk-
taking. Hmieleski and Baron (2009) tested the hypothesis that dispositional optimism 
would be negatively related to the performance of entrepreneurs’ new ventures. 
Participants, who were executive officers of new business ventures, completed the Life 
Orientation Test, as well as measures of entrepreneurial experience and performance (as 
measured by revenue growth and employment growth). Consistent with their hypothesis, 
there was a negative relationship between entrepreneurs’ optimism and the performance 
of their new ventures. Interestingly, the negative relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
optimism and performance was stronger when entrepreneurs had more experience. The 
authors speculated that the findings can be attributed to optimists’ high confidence and 
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tendency to ignore negative information. These tendencies can interfere with making 
good business decisions. These findings highlight the importance of adjusting one’s 
expectations in light of new information, especially if it is unfavourable. The implication 
of this is that ignorance of unfavourable information may result in impaired decision 
making, which can have negative consequences (especially in high-risk contexts). 
What can be concluded from both studies is that entrepreneurship and gambling 
are similar in that they involve taking risks with money and require some degree of 
persistence in order to achieve a successful outcome. But this is often a double-edged 
sword. Just as the maladaptive persistence of the problem gambler can lead to large 
losses of money, optimism may make entrepreneurs persist in their pursuit of 
unmanageable goals, which in turn can lead to impaired business performance. 
Optimism and health. In the domain of health, de Ridder and colleagues (2000) 
examined the effects of optimism among people diagnosed with two types of chronic 
illness: Parkinson’s disease and multiple sclerosis. Although the authors found that 
optimism (as measured using the Life Orientation Test) was associated with greater 
physical autonomy, social adjustment, and psychological adjustment among people 
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (a disease marked by extreme levels of 
uncontrollability and unpredictability), no significant associations were found between 
optimism and physical autonomy or social adjustment among people with Parkinson’s 
disease (a more controllable disease). The authors speculated that optimism was less 
beneficial for people with Parkinson’s disease because it can interfere with behaviours 
that help people manage their condition. In addition, they found a curvilinear relationship 
between optimism and both task-oriented and avoidant coping for people diagnosed with 
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either disease. This suggests that moderate levels of optimism promoted higher levels of 
both forms of coping. It is important to note that avoidant coping is not always harmful, 
particularly in the context of chronic illness (Suls & Fletcher, 1985). The authors 
speculated that high levels of optimism may have inhibited more constructive forms of 
coping amongst people who are experiencing chronic stressors.  
Milam and colleagues (2004) examined the relationships between dispositional 
optimism and pessimism and the course of HIV infection. The participants were patients 
diagnosed with HIV who were undergoing antiretroviral therapy. Optimism and 
pessimism (assessed using the Life Orientation Test) were examined separately. Disease 
progression was assessed by measuring viral load and CD4 counts. While there was a 
positive correlation between baseline pessimism and higher viral load, patients who 
reported higher levels of optimism had lower CD4 counts (indicating more advanced 
HIV) compared to patients with moderate levels of optimism. The authors speculated that 
stress occurs when HIV patients who have high levels of optimism are disappointed with 
their treatment’s modest benefits, which compromises the immune system. The 
implication of this study is that some optimists may experience stress when things go 
worse than they expected. These findings support the idea that moderate levels of 
optimism may be better than high levels of optimism under adverse conditions. 
Chang and Sivam (2004) examined the effects of defensive pessimism on 
compliance with direct and indirect SARS-related preventive health behaviours in a 
general sample of people from Singapore (the location of a major SARS outbreak). Direct 
preventive behaviours were those that limited one’s risk of contracting SARS, such as 
wearing a face mask. Indirect preventive behaviours were those that were perceived to 
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improve one’s general health, like exercising and taking health supplements. While 
defensive pessimism was found to be associated with negative affect and SARS-related 
fears, the results also showed that there was a positive correlation between defensive 
pessimism and both indirect and direct preventive health-related behaviours. The 
implication of this study is that strategically pessimistic expectations can serve to 
motivate people into action, rather than inhibit such behaviour with paralyzing anxiety. 
These findings are consistent with the idea that pessimism can be beneficial in decision-
making contexts, where anxiety can lead to protective behaviours to avert possible 
negative outcomes (e.g. Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). 
How might optimism lead to being less likely to engage in health behaviours? 
Optimists are prone to having an attentional bias for positive stimuli relative to negative 
stimuli (Segerstrom, 2001). This ‘blind spot’ may contribute to a sense of personal 
invulnerability amongst optimists that may lessen genuine concern about health threats. 
Perceived vulnerability is a key component of the Health Belief Model (Janz & Becker, 
1984). According to this model, individuals who underestimate the risk of experiencing a 
negative health outcome are less likely to take actions in an effort to avoid that outcome 
(Rosenstock, 1974). Unrealistic optimism interacts with the Health Belief Model by 
reducing risk perception (Clarke, Lovegrove, Williams, & Machperson, 2000). Previous 
studies have found that people scoring high on danger invulnerability are less likely to 
engage in preventive health behaviours (Ravert & Zimet, 2009) and more likely to 
engage in risky behaviours (Ravert, Schwartz, Zamboanga, Kim, Weisskirch, & 
Bersamin, 2009). Unrealistic optimism has been found to be associated with 
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invulnerability (Lapsley & Hill, 2010). Thus, it is plausible that perceived invulnerability 
might moderate the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours.  
Optimism and academics. Haynes and colleagues (2006) compared the 
academic performance of students who scored either in the lower tertile (“low-optimists”) 
or upper tertile (“over-optimists”) on the Life Orientation Test. The authors randomly 
assigned university students to either an attributional retraining intervention or a control 
group. Attributional retraining (Ruthig, Perry, Hall, & Hladkyj, 2004) is a cognitive 
intervention designed to promote the use of internal attributions for poor performance 
(e.g. effort or strategy) rather than uncontrollable factors (e.g. test difficulty or instructor 
quality). They found students who did not receive attributional retraining and scored high 
on optimism showed an increase in maladaptive attributions for poor academic 
performance (they attributed poor academic performance to external, uncontrollable 
factors such as test difficulty and teacher quality). The authors speculated that these 
maladaptive attributions may reduce students’ motivation and achievement performance. 
Among students who did not receive the attributional retraining intervention, over-
optimists had slightly (but not significantly) lower final exam and GPA scores than low-
optimists. Overall, these findings suggest that optimism (in the absence of attributional 
retraining) may have little effect on exam scores.  
Sweeny and Shepperd (2010) examined whether optimistic expectations would be 
associated with negative affect after receiving feedback in a sample of undergraduate 
psychology students. The authors found that optimistic expectations were unrelated to 
pre-feedback negative affect after controlling for students’ exam performance. However, 
they found that optimistic students experienced an increase in negative affect after 
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receiving exam feedback. In contrast, pessimistic students experienced a decrease in 
negative affect after receiving exam feedback. The authors concluded that the findings 
support the idea that bracing for negative feedback by lowering expectations can be 
beneficial for one’s emotional well-being. These findings suggest that in contexts where 
there is a good chance that one may receive negative feedback, it may be wise to adopt a 
more pessimistic stance in order to prevent feelings of disappointment. 
Eronen and colleagues (1998) investigated the effects of several achievement 
strategies on students’ academic achievement. Students were classified as using either 
defensive pessimistic, optimistic, impulsive, or self-handicapping strategies. Participants 
filled out questionnaires measuring achievement strategies, planning strategies, self-
esteem, depression, and academic satisfaction. Academic achievement was assessed 
using data on the number of classes students passed, which was obtained from university 
records. Defensive pessimists passed more courses than students who used an optimistic 
strategy in their first two years of university (there was no difference between the two 
groups in their third year of study). They also engaged in more rational planning than the 
students using the other three strategies. These results suggest that pessimism may be 
useful for challenging tasks like exams, where anxiety can be harnessed and used to 
motivate preparation (although pessimists may be more likely to give up following 
failure).  
What mediators might cause the relationship between optimism and academic 
performance to turn negative? Eronen et al. attributed defensive pessimists’ better 
academic performance to their greater use of rational planning, a type of problem-focused 
coping strategy usually associated with optimists (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). 
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Similarly, Haynes et al. (2006) speculated that optimists’ tendency to make external 
attributions may make them less likely to engage in proactive learning behaviours (i.e. 
attending class regularly, studying, or seeking help from the instructor). In addition, 
Shields (2001) found that approach coping strategies were related to academic success.  
Summary 
As can be seen from this review, there are only a few studies that have found 
negative effects of optimism. There are two explanations for the lack of studies showing 
a deleterious effect of optimism that will be reviewed here. First, it may be because 
optimism is simply far more beneficial than it is harmful, and the ratio of studies is an 
accurate reflection of optimism’s benefits relative to its drawbacks. Although this is 
plausible, it would be premature to make this inference. In order to draw this conclusion, 
more studies allowing for the detection of negative effects of optimism would need to be 
conducted. Second, there is a possibility that there are unpublished studies where 
researchers did not find support for a directional hypothesis that predicted positive effects 
of optimism. A finding of null, non-hypothesized, or contrary results may have dissuaded 
researchers from submitting their studies for peer review. This “file-drawer” effect, while 
plausible, is impossible to ascertain.  
Sobering up: Shifting from Optimism 
As suggested by Norem and Chang (2001; 2002), there are benefits and costs to 
both optimism and pessimism, and these costs and benefits depend on the context. 
Theorists have suggested that situational factors can cause people to “sober up” (Sweeny 
& Krizan, 2013) and lower their expectations. In what circumstances do some people 
change their expectancies (from optimism to pessimism and vice versa)?  
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Insight into why shifts from optimism occur can be drawn from several papers on 
bracing (Shepperd et al., 1996; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van 
der Pligt, 2003). Similarly to defensive pessimism, bracing often occurs when individuals 
perceive that an undesirable outcome is more likely to occur than would be justified by 
objective evidence, in order to prepare for bad news (Carroll et al., 2006; Shepperd, 
Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007). While 
optimism is considered the most optimal strategy in most circumstances, there are 
contexts in which people become more pessimistic. Shifts from optimism are thought to 
occur in response to new information and in an attempt to brace for anticipated 
disappointment (Sweeny et al., 2006). The authors assert that these shifts from optimism 
serve a useful purpose. They propose that these changes in expectancies are the result of a 
need for preparedness, which enables individuals to respond in situations with uncertain 
outcomes.  
First, when outcomes are perceived as important, people tend to shift from 
optimism (Shepperd et al., 2000; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998; 
van Dijk et al., 2003). For example, people are more likely to shift from optimism when 
the consequences of a disease are severe rather than benign. It is thought that this shift 
serves to motivate behaviours intended to avoid risk in high-risk situations. 
Second, when people perceive feedback is imminent, people shift from optimism 
(Shepperd et al., 1996; van Dijk et al., 2003). It is thought that immediately before 
receiving feedback in performance situations, people lower their expectations in order to 
prepare for the possibility that they may be disappointed. By lowering expectations right 
before receiving feedback, one can remain optimistic (and thus reap the benefits of 
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optimism) up until the point at which optimism would become more detrimental than 
beneficial (Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007). 
Third, when it is easy to imagine undesired outcomes, people are more likely to 
shift from optimism (Sanna, 1999). This occurs because people engage in mental 
simulations of potential outcomes prior to their occurrence. When negative outcomes are 
difficult to imagine, people are less likely to engage in mental simulations of their 
occurrence, and thus can remain optimistic. For example, the possibility of failing a 
difficult test would be easier for individuals to imagine than failing an easy test (Sweeny 
& Shepperd, 2007).  
Lastly, when outcomes are perceived to be uncontrollable, people shift from 
optimism. For example, students feel a high degree of control at the beginning of the 
semester and are thus optimistic (Shepperd et al., 1996). At the final exam, however, 
there is little that students can do to affect the outcome, and they become more 
pessimistic. Similarly, people feel optimistic when they think they can control the impact 
of an undesirable outcome. For example, people perceive controllable diseases as being 
less serious than uncontrollable diseases (Carroll et al., 2007).  
A New Construct: Expectancy Flexibility  
To reconcile the inconsistent findings for optimism and pessimism, I propose that 
expectancy flexibility moderates the effects of optimism/pessimism. Expectancy 
flexibility is defined as the ability to change one’s expectations of the future in response 
to contextual cues. It is my belief that optimism may interact with expectancy flexibility 
to influence whether outcomes are positive or negative.   
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Expectancy flexibility was inspired by Seligman’s unheeded suggestion that 
individuals ought to practice flexible optimism (Forgeard & Seligman, 2012; Seligman, 
1991). Seligman (1991) defines flexible optimists as people who are generally optimistic, 
but are occasionally pessimistic in some situations: “The most adaptive outlook therefore 
seems to be mostly optimistic, tempered with small doses of realistic pessimism when 
needed…The key appears to be able to shift between optimism and pessimism, rather 
than being locked into constant pessimism, or rigid optimism” (p. 115). Similarly, Norem 
and Chang (2001) noted that: “situations where the potential ‘downside’ is either 
relatively likely or relatively serious would seem especially to call for a balance of 
pessimism and optimism. Currently, almost no research exists on the extent to which 
individuals (or on which individuals) are able to achieve this kind of balance or 
flexibility” (p. 354). Norem and Chang’s observation that there is a dearth of research in 
this area remains true today. The present research aims to rectify this gap in the literature. 
In this dissertation, I present a model of flexible optimism. Of particular interest 
to the present study is inflexible optimism. Based on the evidence provided above, it 
seems that expectancy flexibility is independent of optimism and pessimism. Both 
optimists and pessimists have the potential to react flexibly (or inflexibly) to contexts 
based on the perceived level of risk and reward in that situation. To this end, I have 
developed a measure of expectancy flexibility called the Expectancy Flexibility Scale 
(EFS). The development and validation of this scale is described in detail in Studies 1 
through 4. 
Proposed model of expectancy flexibility. The precise nature of expectancy 
flexibility and its correlates is currently unknown. However, several aspects of its nature 
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can be deduced from prior research. First, expectancy flexibility is a personality trait 
because some people are better able to shift their expectations than others. Second, given 
that both optimists and pessimists can adjust their expectations, expectancy flexibility is 
distinct from optimism and pessimism. Third, inflexibility is not simply extreme 
optimism (or pessimism) and flexibility is not merely the midpoint of optimism and 
pessimism. This differs somewhat from Wallston’s (1994) untested speculation that 
cockeyed optimists would score higher on the LOT than cautious optimists. If this were 
the case, then curvilinear effects for optimism would be evident in the research literature, 
but only one study (Milam et al., 2004) supports this notion. It is my belief (based on 
what information has been gathered so far) that it is not that being overly optimistic that 
is harmful, but rather being optimistic at the wrong time. Thus, it is proposed that 
expectancy flexibility is a personality trait distinct from dispositional 
optimism/pessimism.  
This approach could be used to bring disparate theories on optimism into a unified 
framework. Expectancy flexibility may potentially reconcile dispositional optimism 
(Scheier & Carver, 1985) with defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986) and 
unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980). Defensive pessimism can be thought of as 
analogous to flexible pessimism. Defensive and flexible pessimists both share negative 
expectancies for the future, but only in circumstances where pessimism can be beneficial. 
Similarly, unrealistic optimism can be thought of as analogous to inflexible optimism. 
Both unrealistic and inflexible optimists are positive about the future even when it is 
potentially disadvantageous. Lastly, dispositional optimism and pessimism are similar to 
flexible optimism and inflexible pessimism, respectively.  
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Alternatives to expectancy flexibility. Before creating a new construct and 
measure, I consulted the literature to determine whether pre-existing constructs could be 
used as a measure of expectancy flexibility. The reason for this is that if a reliable and 
valid construct already exists, then there is no need for a new measure. I will review these 
considered alternatives in turn. 
As an alternative to optimism, several researchers have advocated for realism 
(Bortolotti & Antrobus, 2015; Schneider, 2001). However, defining realism is 
problematic, as Held (2002) points out. To briefly paraphrase Held’s argument, reality is 
too subjective to define objectively because it is subject to individual bias and cultural 
influences. Injunctions to “be realistic” are of little help as everyone has their own idea of 
subjective probabilities, which may or may not turn out to be accurate. This is a serious 
limitation of the unrealistic optimism approach (Weinstein, 1980), which relies on events 
with exact probabilities. Although it is possible to compare individuals’ subjective 
probabilities with known probabilities for narrowly-defined events (e.g. the probability 
that a smoker will develop lung cancer), this approach cannot be applied to most 
everyday events, for which probabilities are unknown. Because of these flaws, I believe 
flexibility is preferable as it avoids the potential pitfalls of realism in a subjective world. 
Other definitions of flexibility exist, including psychological flexibility, cognitive 
flexibility, and coping flexibility. Although all of these constructs have flexibility in their 
names, they appear to be conceptually distinct from expectancy flexibility. Psychological 
flexibility is similar to expectancy flexibility in that it allows people to adjust to 
fluctuating situational demands (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), but in practice has more 
to do with having an awareness and acceptance of one’s thoughts and feelings (Hayes, 
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Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Similarly, cognitive flexibility (Martin & Rubin, 1995) is 
defined as having an awareness that one can behave in many different ways in a given 
situation. However, cognitive flexibility is not limited to one’s beliefs about the future. 
Lastly, coping flexibility (Kato, 2012) is defined as the ability to stop using coping 
strategies when they are ineffective and adopt more effective coping strategies. There is 
some similarity between this construct and expectancy flexibility, especially if one views 
optimism as a strategy rather than a trait. Even so, coping is a far broader concept than 
optimism so it is expected that any association with coping flexibility will be modest. 
In a recent article, Hanssen, Vancleef, Vlaeyen, Hayes, Schouten, and Peters 
(2015) proposed that the ability to flexibly adjust goals might mediate the relationship 
between dispositional optimism and various types of well-being, including general well-
being, anxiety, and depression. They found that flexible goal adjustment was the primary 
mechanism through which dispositional optimism influences well-being. In contrast, no 
such mediational effect was found for tenacious goal pursuit. These findings are relevant 
because they suggest that flexibility may mediate the beneficial effects of optimism. 
However, despite the similarities, Hanssen et al.’s view of flexibility concerns flexible 
goal adjustment, rather than flexible expectations (of interest in the present study). 
The last alternative to expectancy flexibility is defensive pessimism. While 
defensive pessimism has its benefits, it also has negative effects on psychological well-
being. For example, defensive pessimists have higher levels of anxiety (Showers & 
Ruben, 1990). Clearly, the benefits of defensive pessimism are diminished if it is 
accompanied with unpleasant feelings of anxiety.  
Hypotheses  
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Rationale. The first aim of this study is to extend past research to investigate 
whether there are some contexts in which optimism is disadvantageous. The second, and 
more important, aim is to investigate the mechanism that explains this, i.e. expectancy 
flexibility. This study will determine whether expectancy flexibility adds incremental 
validity to the prediction of outcomes above and beyond that of optimism. That is, is it 
truly better to be a flexible optimist (as Seligman suggests) rather than simply an 
optimist? 
Three contexts were chosen to test whether optimism can sometimes be 
maladaptive: gambling, health behaviours, and academic performance. These contexts 
were chosen because past research (e.g. Chang & Sivam, 2004; Eronen et al., 1998; 
Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004; Haynes et al., 2006) has suggested that pessimism may be 
a better strategy than optimism in these contexts. These contexts may also provide a way 
to test whether expectancy flexibility ameliorates the harmful effects of optimism. 
Problem gambling behaviours were chosen as an outcome variable based on the 
findings of earlier research (e.g. Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004) that suggested that 
optimism was related to problem gambling behaviours. Although Gibson and 
Sanbonmatsu’s sample was not comprised exclusively of problem gamblers, their 
findings suggest that optimists (especially inflexible optimists) may be more vulnerable 
to gambling problems. Flexibility’s role in this relationship can be elucidated from a 
study of optimism’s effects on entrepreneurial performance (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). 
The qualities that Hmieleski and Baron ascribe to optimistic entrepreneurs (i.e. a 
tendency toward unrealistic expectations, overconfidence, and discounting of negative 
information) are similar to my conceptualization of inflexibility. It seems plausible that 
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expectancy flexibility could reduce maladaptive persistence. Expectancy flexibility could 
help optimists get “unstuck” from persistence by lowering their expectations in situations 
where their optimism leads them to persevere despite unfavourable odds. 
Another context in which optimism may have negative effects is in inhibiting 
preventive health behaviours (Chang & Sivam, 2004). How might flexibility affect this 
relationship? The finding of a curvilinear relationship between optimism and both task-
oriented and avoidant coping suggests that moderate level of optimism may be more 
beneficial than the extremes of optimism and pessimism (de Ridder et al., 2000). It is 
plausible that flexibility may reduce feelings of invulnerability amongst optimists by 
putting them in a more realistic mindset. In the presence of a perceived threat to their 
health, flexible optimists may be more likely to undertake preventive health behaviours 
than their inflexible counterparts. Taken together, it seems that expectancy flexibility 
may influence one’s feelings of invulnerability about one’s health, which in turn 
moderates the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours.  
In the academic domain, optimism’s negative or null effects on academic 
performance (Haynes et al., 2006) may be attributed to expectancy flexibility. I would 
propose that this moderating role would manifest in an inverse relationship between 
optimism and academic success among those scoring low on flexibility. Based on the 
findings reviewed earlier, I would speculate that this association is mediated by approach 
coping style. Optimists scoring high on flexibility are thought to be more likely to use 
approach forms of coping and less avoidant forms of coping. In contrast, optimists 
scoring low on flexibility may be more prone to using more avoidant forms of coping and 
less approach forms of coping.  
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 Current study. The primary purpose of the current study was to investigate the 
link between optimism and several outcomes (problem gambling, preventive health 
behaviour, and academic success) and the role of expectancy flexibility in these 
associations. The primary research question in this study was: Does optimism have 
detrimental effects in some contexts? A secondary research question was: What variables 
mediate or moderate these effects? A third research question was: Does flexibility 
moderate or mediate associations between optimism and its outcomes?  
Two moderated mediation models (Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007) and a 
mediated moderation model (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) were proposed to examine 
these research questions. In both moderated mediation models, optimism was selected as 
the independent variable and expectancy flexibility was selected as the moderator. The 
models differed with regard to their mediator and outcome. Problem gambling was 
thought to be mediated by luck/perseverance and moderated by expectancy flexibility 
(Figure 1). Similarly, academic success was thought to be mediated by academic 
approach coping and moderated by expectancy flexibility (Figure 3). 
In the first model, it was hypothesized that luck/perseverance would mediate the 
relationship between optimism and problem gambling such that higher levels of optimism 
would lead to higher levels of luck/perseverance, which in turn would lead to higher 
levels of problem gambling. It was also hypothesized that expectancy flexibility would 
moderate the association between optimism and luck/perseverance. That is, people 
scoring high on expectancy flexibility would exhibit a smaller association between 
optimism and luck/perseverance. 
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Figure 1. Moderated mediation model for problem gambling 
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In the second model, I examined the moderating effect of expectancy flexibility 
on the relationship between optimism and preventive health behaviours, mediated by 
invulnerability. Research on defensive pessimism (e.g. Chang & Sivam, 2004), which is 
believed to be closely related to expectancy flexibility, suggests that low levels of 
expectancy flexibility increase feelings of invulnerability. This, in turn, would weaken 
the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours. It was hypothesized 
that expectancy flexibility would moderate the positive relationship between optimism 
and preventive health behaviours such that it would reduce the effect of optimism on 
preventive health behaviours (i.e. lower levels of flexibility would reduce the relationship 
between optimism and preventive health behaviours). In addition, this moderating effect 
would be mediated by danger invulnerability. That is, it is predicted that individuals 
scoring low on expectancy flexibility would score higher on invulnerability, which in 
turn would moderate the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours.  
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Figure 2. Mediated moderation model for preventive health behaviour. 
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In the third model, I tested whether academic approach coping would mediate the 
relation between optimism and academic success. It was hypothesized that expectancy 
flexibility would moderate the indirect effect of optimism on academic success through 
academic approach coping. That is, it was predicted that people scoring high on 
expectancy flexibility would exhibit a weaker relationship between optimism and 
academic approach coping. 
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Figure 3. Moderated mediation model for academic success 
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Study 1 
A new scale known as the Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS) was developed to 
examine the construct of expectancy flexibility. To develop and validate this scale, three 
pilot studies were conducted. Items for the new scale were inspired by the writings of 
several authors who have written about flexible optimism and related concepts (Forgeard 
& Seligman, 2012; Norem & Chang, 2001; Sweeny et al., 2010; Wallston, 1994). In 
addition, items needed to be answerable by both optimists and pessimists (which ruled 
out items that could only be endorsed by optimists or pessimists). The objective of these 
pilot studies was to test the reliability and validity of the EFS. Reliability of the scale was 
assessed by examining internal consistency reliability. Validity was assessed by 
examining convergent and discriminant validity.  
Internal consistency reliability. Internal consistency reliability is defined as the 
degree to which test items measure the same construct (Miller, Lovler, & McIntire, 
2013). The items of a scale ought to be broad enough in scope so as not to be redundant, 
but related enough to be internally consistent. The internal consistency reliability of the 
EFS was assessed by examining Cronbach’s α for the entire scale.  
Convergent validity. Evidence for convergent validity of a new scale can be 
found by correlating it with measures of similar constructs. To establish convergent 
validity for the EFS, the EFS was evaluated against several related scales. If an 
instrument has good convergent validity, it should be significantly correlated with scales 
that are thought to assess similar constructs. However, very strong correlations would be 
cause for concern. This is because high correlations would suggest that the EFS 
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instrument is a redundant and unnecessary scale (Garson, 2001). Other existing (and 
better-validated) measures could be used to assess the construct of expectancy flexibility. 
Because expectancy flexibility is thought to explain the phenomenon of defensive 
pessimism, the Expectancy Flexibility Scale should be positively correlated with the 
Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire and the Cognitive Flexibility Scale. Both concepts 
have conceptual overlap with expectancy flexibility. However, defensive pessimism is 
conceptualized as a strategy rather than a personality trait. In addition, cognitive 
flexibility is not limited to one’s beliefs about the future, but applies to all situations. 
Although a robust correlation is expected, a very high correlation (r > .50) would be 
concerning because it would suggest that the expectancy flexibility construct strongly 
overlaps with an existing construct. 
Discriminant validity. Evidence for discriminant validity of a new scale can be 
found by correlating it with measures of unrelated constructs. To establish discriminant 
validity for the EFS, the EFS was evaluated against several scales that could be related to 
expectancy flexibility but should be unrelated. It was expected that the EFS would be 
independent of the constructs of social desirability and dispositional optimism. A 
significant correlation with social desirability would suggest that EFS scores were 
influenced by perceived desirability. It was expected that expectancy flexibility and 
optimism would be distinct constructs; thus, it was expected that expectancy flexibility 
would have no more than a small correlation with optimism. In other words, as a group, 
optimists ought not to be more flexible than pessimists (or vice versa). 
In addition, the Coping Flexibility Scale was included as evidence of discriminant 
validity. However, despite the similarity in names, this scale does not appear to measure a 
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construct similar to expectancy flexibility. It is expected that the Expectancy Flexibility 
Scale will not be associated with this scale. 
Lastly, expectancy flexibility was thought to be uncorrelated with locus of 
control, as measured by the Locus of Control of Behaviour Scale (Craig, Franklin, & 
Andrews, 1984). Locus of control (Rotter, 1966) is defined as either being internal (a 
sense that one has control over one’s life) or external (one’s life is controlled by luck or 
fate). While a modest correlation may be possible (because both inflexibility shares a 
sense of fatalism with having an external locus of control), it is expected that locus of 
control is a distinct construct from flexibility.  
Hypotheses. The hypotheses for Study 1 were:  
H1: The EFS scale measures a unitary construct with a single factor. 
H2: To demonstrate convergent validity, the EFS will be moderately positively correlated 
with conceptually similar constructs (defensive pessimism and cognitive flexibility).  
H3: To demonstrate discriminant validity, the EFS will be uncorrelated with conceptually 
dissimilar constructs (coping flexibility, social desirability and optimism). 
Method (Study 1) 
Participants. A sample of 250 students was recruited using the University of 
Windsor’s Department of Psychology Participant Pool in the Fall semester of 2014. This 
sample size is consistent with the heuristic that for scales with fewer than 40 items, a 
sample size of 200 respondents is considered adequate (DeVellis, 2003). No restrictions 
were placed on participant recruitment.  
The sample was comprised of 210 participants identifying as female and 40 
participants identifying as male. No participants identified as transgender. The mean age 
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was 20.53 years (range = 17 to 48). The ethnic characteristics of the sample were as 
follows, ordered from largest to smallest: White / European (n = 177, 70.8%), Middle 
Eastern (n = 17, 6.8%), South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (n = 12, 4.8%), East Asian / 
Chinese / Japanese (n = 12, 4.8%), Black / African / Caribbean (n = 11, 4.4%), Bi / 
Multiracial (n = 10, 4.0%), Aboriginal / Metis / First Nations (n = 5, 2.0%), “Other” (n = 
4, 1.6%), and Latin / South American (n = 2, 0.8%).  
Measures. The measures chosen for this study were included in order to test the 
convergent and discriminant validity of the EFS. The measures used in this study were 
administered in the following order: 
Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS). Expectancy flexibility was operationally 
defined as the ability to adjust one’s expectations for the future depending on contextual 
factors. The initial scale was composed of 20 items (consistent with the recommendations 
of Clark and Watson, the size of this item pool was intentionally greater than is 
necessary). Participants used a 5-point Likert scale to respond to the items, on which a 
“0” represented “strongly disagree” and a “4” represented “strongly agree”. This was (by 
intention) the same rating scale used for the LOT. The author evaluated each item for its 
content validity and clarity. All of the items were tested for readability. The average 
reading level of the items as assessed using the Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level was 6.7, 
with a range from 3.7 to 9.3 (for comparison, the six non-filler items of the LOT-R have 
an average reading level of 5.0). The items were preliminarily tested by asking several 
individuals to complete the EFS and to remark on any problematic items. The items 
administered to participants in the pilot study are summarized in Table 1, along with the 
readability index.  
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Table 1  
The Expectancy Flexibility Scale (used in Study 1) 
Item Readability 
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.  8.0 
2. I often ignore information that doesn’t fit my expectations.*  8.9 
3. There are times when I choose to be optimistic.  3.7 
4.  I am optimistic some of the time.  4.0 
5.  I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.*  9.1 
6. My expectations for the future are based on similar past events.  8.0 
7. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well. 7.8 
8. When I think about the future, I try to put my own biases aside.   5.0 
9. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.  8.8 
10. I lower my expectations when I am facing an important event.  9.1 
11. I am optimistic only when I think it will help me.  4.8 
12. I lower my expectations only when I can imagine things could go 
badly.  
8.5 
13. I believe that being too optimistic is just as bad as being too 
pessimistic.  
9.3 
14. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my 
control.  
8.0 
15. I am pessimistic some of the time. 4.0 
16. I create the future that I want by preparing for the worst.  3.8 
17. I become more pessimistic right before I receive my grades.  7.2 
18. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism.  7.6 
19. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic.  3.7 
20. I am pessimistic only when I think it will help me. 4.8 
* Item was reverse-scored. 
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. This scale was published by 
Crowne and Marlowe (1960). It measures a tendency to respond in a socially desirable 
manner and was used by Scheier and Carver (1985) in their validation of the LOT. Most 
of the items reflect a desire to present oneself as always behaving appropriately and 
lacking in unacceptable impulses. An example item is “I'm always willing to admit it 
when I make a mistake.” The scale is composed of 33 items, 15 of which are reverse-
scored. The items are answered using a true-or-false format. Crowne and Marlowe (1960) 
reported that the internal consistency coefficient for the scale (using KR-20) was .88 and 
found a one-month test-retest correlation of r = .89.  
Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire (DPQ). Participants’ defensive pessimism 
was measured using the Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire (DPQ), which was 
originally published by Norem (2001). The DPQ is a 12-item measure rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me). Defensive 
pessimism is defined as a strategy that involves lowering one’s expectations in order to 
help manage anxiety or prevent disappointment.  
This scale is designed to measure defensive pessimism in a general situation. An example 
item is “Considering what can go wrong helps me prepare.” The DPQ contains no 
reversed-scored items. The DPQ demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability 
(α = .78), as reported by Lim (2009). 
Coping Flexibility Scale. This scale was designed by Kato (2012) to measure 
coping flexibility. Coping flexibility is composed of two subscales: evaluation coping and 
adaptive coping. According to Kato, evaluation coping is defined as “the ability to 
discontinue an ineffective coping strategy” (p. 262). Adaptive coping is defined as the 
 A Glass Half Full    45 
 
ability to “produce and implement an alternative coping strategy” (p. 262).  The scale is 
composed of 10 items, and has two 5-item subscales that measure evaluation coping and 
adaptive coping. Participants rated each item using a 4-point scale (ranging from 0 = not 
applicable to 3 = very applicable). An example item is: “When a stressful situation has 
not improved, I try to think of other ways to cope with it.” Kato (2012) reported good 
internal consistency for the evaluation coping (α = .72-.88) and adaptive coping (α = .78-
.89) subscales. Six-week test–retest reliability coefficients were adequate for both the 
evaluation coping (r = .73) and adaptive coping (r = .71) subscales.  
Cognitive Flexibility Scale. This scale was designed by Martin and Rubin (1995) 
to measure one’s ability to change cognitive sets to adapt to environmental change. The 
Cognitive Flexibility Scale is composed of 12 items. Four items are reverse-scored. 
Participants respond to these items using a 6-point Likert scale that ranges from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater cognitive 
flexibility. The internal consistency reliability was reported to be in the good range (α = 
.76-.77; Martin & Rubin, 1995). An example item is: “I can communicate an idea in 
many different ways”. 
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R). Participants’ optimism was assessed 
by administering the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 
1994). The LOT-R consists of six scored items and four filler items. Three of the items 
measure optimism, and the other three items measure pessimism. An example of an 
optimism item is: “Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”. An 
example of a pessimism item is: “If something can go wrong for me, it will”. Participants 
respond to these items using a Likert scale that ranges from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 
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(strongly agree). The three pessimism items are reverse-scored. Scores can range from 0 
to 24, with higher scores meaning greater optimism.  
Locus of Control of Behavior Scale. This scale was developed by Craig, 
Franklin, and Andrews (1984) to measure individuals’ perception of the degree of control 
that they have over their lives. This scale is composed of 17 items that are rated on a six-
point scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Six items (1, 5, 
7, 8, 13 and 16) are reverse-scored. Thus, scores can range from 0 to 85, with higher 
scores indicating a greater external (rather than internal) locus of control. Craig et al. 
(1984) reported that the scale has acceptable internal consistency reliability (α = .79) and 
has excellent one-week test-retest reliability (r = .90). An example of an item measuring 
(internal) locus of control was: “I can anticipate difficulties and take action to avoid 
them”. 
Demographics. The participants were asked to provide their age, gender, ethnic 
identity, and year of study. 
Procedure 
The pilot study was conducted using an online survey hosted on FluidSurveys. 
The study took approximately 30 minutes to complete. In compensation for their 
participation in the study, participants received one-half of a bonus point that could be 
added to their grade in a psychology course. The scales were administered in the same 
order as they appeared in the Measures section. To ensure that the participants’ responses 
to the EFS would not be biased by reading other measures in the questionnaire battery, 
participants completed the EFS first.  
Data analysis 
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Before analyses began, the dataset was examined for missing data. Data were 
examined for whether they were missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at 
random (MAR), or missing not at random (MNAR). Missing data were replaced using 
the multiple imputation technique, which is the preferred method for handling missing 
data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).  
The scale was refined in three steps (see the flowchart depicted in Figure 4). 
These steps are based on published guidelines on scale development (DeVellis, 2003). 
The first step was to conduct an analysis of the internal consistency reliability of the EFS 
items. This step was intended to remove items that correlated poorly with the scale total. 
In the second step, I conducted a factor analysis of the EFS items that remained after the 
first step. This step was intended to determine whether or not the scale was multifactorial. 
In the third step, I conducted a series of correlations between the EFS items remaining 
after the second step with related and unrelated scales. This step was intended to establish 
convergent and divergent validity of the EFS. 
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Figure 4. Algorithm for EFS scale development.  
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In the first step, I conducted a reliability analysis of the EFS items. Following 
published recommendations for scale developers (Nunnally, 1978; Clark & Watson, 
1995), I expected a minimum value for coefficient α of .70 (while this value is arbitrary, 
it is the most generally accepted minimum standard for internal consistency reliability of 
a scale in the literature). If the scale’s reliability was between .70 and .90, then no 
revisions were deemed necessary and I proceeded to the second step. If the alpha 
coefficient of the scale was less than .70, corrected item-total correlations were 
examined. The item with the lowest item-total correlation was deleted in an effort to 
increase the scale’s overall α level. Each time an item was deleted, a new reliability 
analysis was performed. This process continued until the alpha level reached .70 or until 
there were no items left to remove that would substantially raise the scale’s reliability. If 
α > .90, this was also cause for concern. Very high reliabilities indicate that the scale 
items may be redundant and that the construct measured may be overly specific (Briggs 
& Cheek, 1986; Streiner, 2003). Inter-item correlations were examined. The most 
strongly correlated item pair was identified and considered for deletion. In these highly-
correlated item pairs, I removed the item that had the lower item-total correlation. This 
process continued until the scale had an alpha coefficient less than .90 or until there were 
no items left to remove that would substantially lower the scale’s reliability. 
 In the second step, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. The purpose of 
the factor analysis was to test whether multiple factors were present within the revised 
EFS. An oblique (promax) rotation was used to allow for the possibility of correlated 
factors.  The number of factors was obtained using a parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000). 
Items with low factor loadings (less than .3) were deleted. This number is based on 
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Stevens’ (1992) recommendation for a cut-off point for a sample size of 250. If one factor 
was obtained (as expected), then I proceeded to the third step. If more than one factor was 
obtained, the factor with the lowest correlation with optimism was chosen as a measure 
of expectancy flexibility and any items loading on other factors were deleted. This was 
done on the basis that flexibility ought to be uncorrelated with optimism. This factor was 
re-analyzed for its internal consistency reliability using the steps described in the 
previous paragraph. 
 In the third step, correlations were conducted between the revised EFS and 
conceptually similar constructs (defensive pessimism and internal locus of control) and 
conceptually dissimilar constructs (coping flexibility, cognitive flexibility, social 
desirability and optimism). If correlations between the revised EFS and any of the 
conceptually similar constructs were greater than .85 (Garson, 2001), then individual 
items of the EFS were examined for their correlation with these measures. The items with 
the strongest correlations were deleted, and steps 1-3 were repeated. If the correlations 
between the revised EFS and any of the conceptually similar constructs were non-
significant, then individual items of the EFS were examined for their correlation with 
these measures. Items with the weakest (or negative) correlations were deleted, and steps 
1-3 were repeated. If correlations between the revised EFS and any of the conceptually 
dissimilar constructs were significant, then individual items of the EFS were examined 
for their correlation with these measures. The items with the strongest correlations were 
deleted, and steps 1-3 were repeated. 
Results 
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Undergraduate students were recruited through the Psychology participant pool. 
Two hundred and fifty participants completed the survey. None of the participants met 
criteria for listwise deletion (i.e. none of the participants had more than 20% of their data 
missing). Little’s MCAR test indicated that data were missing completely at random. 
Because of this, missing data were replaced using the multiple imputation technique.  
 An analysis of the internal consistency reliability of the original 20-item scale 
found an initial overall alpha value of .68. Removal of six of the items (2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 
20) increased the overall reliability of the 14-item scale (α = .79). No further items were 
removed because removing them would decrease the scale’s overall reliability. The alpha 
value of .79 is very close to the ideal range of .80-.90 and is still considered adequate for 
research purposes (Nunnally, 1978).   
 The correlations between the 14-item version of the EFS and conceptually similar 
and dissimilar constructs are shown in Table 2. A high correlation with defensive 
pessimism was expected; however, the correlation of greatest interest is the correlation 
between the EFS and optimism. The high correlation between optimism and expectancy 
flexibility was cause for concern as it suggested an unexpectedly high degree of overlap 
between the two measures. Because of this, correlations between individual items of the 
EFS and the LOT-R were examined for items that could explain the high correlation. 
Items that had a correlation of more than .3 were considered for deletion. An 
additional six items (12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17) were shown to have high correlations 
with optimism and were deleted. These six items from the EFS and their correlations with 
the LOT are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 2 
Correlations between the EFS and similar and dissimilar constructs 
Construct r 
Defensive pessimism .44** 
Internal locus of control -.28** 
Coping flexibility (EC subscale) -.13* 
Coping flexibility (AC subscale) -.11 (ns) 
Cognitive flexibility .04 (ns) 
Social desirability -.31** 
Optimism -.57** 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A Glass Half Full    53 
 
Table 3 
Correlations between items removed from the EFS and LOT-R 
Item r 
Item 13 -.44 
Item 16 -.40 
Item 17 -.34 
Item 14 -.33 
Item 15 -.32 
Item 12 -.32 
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Table 4 
Items comprising the 8-item EFS scale 
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.  
6. My expectations for the future are based on similar past events.  
7. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well.  
9. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.  
10. I lower my expectations when I am facing an important event. 
11. I am optimistic only when I think it will help me.   
18. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism. 
19. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic.  
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Table 5 
Correlations between the 8-item EFS and similar and dissimilar constructs 
Construct r 
Convergent validity  
    Defensive pessimism .37** 
   Cognitive flexibility -.24** 
Discriminant validity  
   Coping flexibility (evaluative coping) -.04 (ns) 
   Coping flexibility (adaptive coping) -.03 (ns) 
   Internal locus of control -.27** 
   Social desirability -.29** 
   Optimism -.41** 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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The next scale (shown in Table 4) included items 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 19 
from the original scale. The correlation between optimism and the remaining eight EFS 
items was moderate (r = -.41). This means that the amount of variance in the LOT-R 
explained by the EFS was cut in half, decreasing from 33% to 17%. While this is 
considerably lower than the initial correlation (r = -.57), it is still relatively high. 
However, removing the six items lowered reliability (α = .66).  
For Step 3, correlations were re-calculated for the revised EFS and similar and 
dissimilar constructs (see Table 5). The correlations between the 8-item EFS and similar 
scales were similar to those of the 14-item EFS. As can be seen, there are no major 
changes except that the correlation with optimism went down and the correlation with 
cognitive flexibility went up. 
Brief Discussion 
It is clear that there was a trade-off between the reliability of the EFS and the 
magnitude of the correlation between the EFS and the LOT-R. That is, the version of the 
scale with the highest reliability was strongly associated with pessimism. Conversely, the 
version of the scale that had a weaker (though still quite robust) relationship to pessimism 
had lower reliability. The low internal consistency of the EFS is also concerning, as it 
could have attenuated correlations between it and the other measures. In an attempt to 
resolve this issue, another pilot study was conducted to assess whether additional items 
could augment the scale’s internal consistency.  
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Study 2 
 Due to the unexpected and disappointingly high correlation between the EFS 
scale and LOT-R, another pilot study was conducted. One method commonly used for 
increasing scale reliability is to add more items (Kaplan & Sacuzzo, 2012). In the second 
pilot study, five more items were added to the EFS (see items 21-25 in Table 6). It was 
hoped that new items would increase the scale’s reliability. 
Method 
 Participants. I recruited 190 students from the University of Windsor’s 
Department of Psychology Participant Pool in the Winter semester of 2015. Three 
participants were removed from the dataset because of large quantities of missing data, 
leaving a final total of 187. The sample was composed of 138 participants identifying as 
female and 47 participants identifying as male. No participants identified as transgender 
and two participants did not indicate their gender. The mean age was 20.73 (range = 18 to 
36). The ethnic characteristics of the sample was as follows, in descending order of 
frequency: White / European (n = 121), Black / African / Caribbean (n = 16), Middle 
Eastern (n = 13), South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (n = 10), Bi / Multiracial (n = 9), East 
Asian / Chinese / Japanese (n = 8), Latin / South American (n = 6), and “Other” (n = 4). 
Measures. The measures used were identical to those used in Study 1. These 
measures were the Expectancy Flexibility Scale, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale, Defensive Pessimism Scale, Coping Flexibility Scale, Cognitive Flexibility Scale, 
Life Orientation Test-Revised, and the Locus of Control of Behavior Scale. Five new 
items (21-25) were appended to the EFS (see Table 6). Flesch-Kincaid Grade Levels are 
shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate reverse-scored items. 
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Table 6 
Items included in the EFS for Study 2 
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information. (8) 
2. I often ignore information that doesn’t fit my expectations.* (8.9) 
3. There are times when I choose to be optimistic. (3.7) 
4.  I am optimistic some of the time. (4)  
5.  I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.* (9.1) 
6. My expectations for the future are based on similar past events. (8) 
7. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well. (7.8) 
8. When I think about the future, I try to put my own biases aside.  (5) 
9. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect. (8.8) 
10. I lower my expectations when I am facing an important event. (9.1) 
11. I am optimistic only when I think it will help me. (4.8) 
12. I lower my expectations only when I can imagine things could go badly. (8.5) 
13. I believe that being too optimistic is just as bad as being too pessimistic. (9.3) 
14. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my control. (8.0) 
15. I am pessimistic some of the time (4).  
16. I create the future that I want by preparing for the worst. (3.8) 
17. I become more pessimistic right before I receive my grades. (7.2) 
18. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism. (7.6) 
19. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic. (3.7) 
20. I am pessimistic only when I think it will help me. (4.8) 
21. I try to hope for the best but prepare for the worst. (1.9) 
22. I am usually optimistic unless the potential ‘downside’ is relatively likely or serious. 
(4.9) 
23. I adjust my expectations for the future in order to cope with the situation. (9.3) 
24. I try to think about all possible outcomes when I think about the future. (6.7) 
25. When thinking about the future, I try to be as realistic as possible. (7.6) 
*Item was reverse scored 
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Procedure. The procedure used in this study was identical to that used in the first 
study.  
Data analysis. The approach used to address missing data was the same as that 
used in the first pilot study. The strategy used to develop the EFS was tried again with the 
new data provided by Study 2. Doing so largely replicated the findings of Study 1 and 
yielded similarly disappointing results. Because of this, a new approach was used to 
develop the EFS. 
The approach to scale development used in Study 2 was different from that used 
in Study 1. In the second pilot study, an iterative process was used to develop the final 
scale. It was decided that the ideal scale should have adequate reliability (α > .70) and a 
modest correlation with optimism (r < .30) to demonstrate discriminant validity. 
Guidelines for evaluating the discriminant validity of new measures vary greatly; 
however, a cutoff of .30 was judged to be appropriate evidence for discriminant validity, 
as it is smaller than the correlations between the EFS and similar measures, such as 
defensive pessimism. A similar method was used by Lucas, Diener, and Suh (1996) to 
assess the discriminant validity of several well-being measures.   
Starting at item 1, each item was added to the developing scale depending on how 
the addition of the item affected the internal consistency reliability of the overall scale 
and the scale’s correlation with optimism. If the item raised α, but lowered r, the item 
was added to the scale and was not considered for deletion. If the item raised both α and 
r, or lowered both α and r, the item was added to the scale but was considered for 
deletion in the second round. If the item lowered α, but raised r, the item was not added 
to the scale. If, at the end of this process, α failed to reach .70, or if the correlation with 
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optimism exceeded r = -.30, the items were re-examined and considered for deletion. 
Once the scale reached a semi-finalized state, previously rejected items correlating highly 
with the overall scale were re-considered for addition to the scale if they increased α 
and/or decreased r. The scale was finalized when α could not be increased without 
substantially raising r. The algorithm for scale construction is depicted visually in Figure 
5. 
Once a finalized scale was obtained, a factor analysis was conducted. Using 
promax rotation (to allow for the possibility of an oblique solution), two factors were 
extracted. The rationale for extracting two factors was that there are two scales (EFS and 
LOT-R). If the scales were distinct, it was thought that the items from each scale would 
load on the same factor (e.g. the EFS items would load on one factor and the LOT-R 
items would load on the other factor), with few items that did not load on a factor or 
loaded on both factors. If the overall pattern of factor loading was not consistent 
(exhibited either by a large amount of cross-loading items or inconsistent loading), this 
would suggest that expectancy flexibility and optimism were not distinct constructs. 
Lastly, evidence for convergent and discriminant validity was gathered by 
correlating the scale with scales that were thought to be conceptually similar (defensive 
pessimism and internal locus of control) and conceptually dissimilar (coping flexibility, 
cognitive flexibility, social desirability and optimism). Moderate positive correlations 
were expected for the EFS and conceptually similar scales; this would provide evidence 
for convergent validity. No significant correlations were expected for the EFS and 
conceptually dissimilar scales; this would provide evidence for discriminant validity. 
 
 A Glass Half Full    61 
 
Figure 5. Algorithm for EFS scale development used in Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A Glass Half Full    62 
 
Results 
The EFS was constructed using the method stated previously. At the end of the 
first step, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 were included. 
The internal consistency reliability of this scale was marginal (α = .65), but the 
correlation with optimism was quite low (r = -.20, p < .01).   
Because α was less than .70, the items were re-examined. Items with low item-
total correlations (r < .30) were examined. These items were 2, 5, 6, 8, and 11.  Items 
were only removed if the alpha of the EFS could be increased without increasing the 
correlation with optimism too much.  Items 2, 6, 8, and 11 were removed. At this point, 
the scale now consisted of items 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25. The 
internal consistency reliability of this scale increased (α = .67) and the correlation with 
optimism remained the same (r = -.20, p < .01). 
Lastly, items not previously included that were highly correlated with this combination of 
items were considered for inclusion (despite not being included in previous steps).  These 
items were 10, 12, 16, 17, and 19. Items were only added if the alpha of the EFS could be 
increased without increasing the correlation with optimism too much. Of these five items, 
only item 19 was included. With the inclusion of item 19, no other items were deleted or 
added. The final scale consisted of 14 items (1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
and 25). The internal consistency reliability of the scale was acceptable (α = .69). While 
the correlation with optimism was significant, it was quite low (r = -.25, p < .01). This 
scale is both fairly reliable and relatively uncorrelated with optimism. The 14 items 
included in the final scale are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7 
Expectancy Flexibility Scale used in Study 2  
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.  
2. There are times when I choose to be optimistic. 
3. I am optimistic some of the time. 
4. I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.  
5. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well. 
6. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.  
7. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my control.  
8. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism. 
9. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic. 
10. I try to hope for the best but prepare for the worst. 
11. I am usually optimistic unless the potential ‘downside’ is relatively likely or serious. 
12. I adjust my expectations for the future in order to cope with the situation. 
13. I try to think about all possible outcomes when I think about the future. 
14. When thinking about the future, I try to be as realistic as possible. 
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An informal analysis of the items included and not included in the final scale 
suggests that the empirical method used to select or reject items has face validity. Some 
of the rejected items were too suggestive of pessimism (i.e. “I lower my expectations 
when I am facing an important event.”).  Other items were probably too vague (i.e. 
“When I think about the future, I try to put my own biases aside.”). The included items, 
however, seem to have little to do with optimism or pessimism but instead seem to 
suggest flexible expectations and cautiousness (i.e. “I adjust my expectations for the 
future in order to cope with the situation” and “I try to hope for the best but prepare for 
the worst.”). It is interesting to note that all five of the new items added to the EFS in the 
second pilot study were included in the final scale. Descriptive statistics for the EFS are 
shown below in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics for the EFS 
Statistic Value 
Mean 51.18 
Median 52 
Standard Deviation 5.31 
Skewness -.46 
Kurtosis 1.36 
Minimum  33 
Maximum 70 
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To confirm that the flexibility items were distinct from optimism items, a factor 
analysis was conducted. I included all 14 items from the finalized EFS and the six scored 
items from the LOT-R. To allow for the possibility of an oblique solution, I used a 
promax rotation (a varimax rotation was also tried, and the results were very similar to 
the promax rotation). Two factors were extracted. The reason for extracting two factors 
was because there were two scales; it was expected that the items from each scale would 
load on the same factor. If this pattern was not observed, this would indicate some 
overlap between optimism and flexibility items. None of the items were expected to load 
on more than one factor. The pattern matrix is shown in Table 9. Only factor loadings 
greater than .3 (or less than -.3) are displayed in the table.  
The items from the LOT-R all loaded on Factor 1 only. In contrast, all of the 
items from the EFS loaded on Factor 2. However, three items from the EFS (items 3, 4, 
and 19) also loaded on Factor 1. For items 3 and 19, the magnitude of the loading was 
actually greater for Factor 1 than on Factor 2. The positive loading of items 3 and 4 on 
Factor 1 makes sense given that both items contain the word “optimistic”. The negative 
loading of item 19 on Factor 1 also makes sense given that the item contains the word 
“pessimistic” (it is almost identical in wording to item 3). Notwithstanding the cross-
loading of these three items, the overall pattern suggests that optimism and expectancy 
flexibility are distinct constructs. 
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Table 9 
Factor component matrix for the EFS and LOT-R items 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
EFS items  
1  .501 
3 .547 .483 
4 .323 .421 
5*  .305 
7  .468 
9  .552 
14  .407 
18  .552 
19 -.385 .350 
21  .441 
22  .446 
23  .541 
24  .386 
25  .363 
LOT-R items  
1 .613  
3* .602  
4 .673  
7* .719  
9* .644  
10 .738  
*Item was reverse-scored 
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To test the convergent and discriminant validity of the EFS, a series of 
correlations was conducted. As shown in Table 10, there was no significant correlation 
between the EFS and either subscale of the coping flexibility measure. No significant 
correlation was found with internal locus of control. There was a modest (though 
significant) positive correlation between the EFS and cognitive flexibility and a negative 
correlation between EFS and social desirability. As aforementioned, there was also a 
small (though statistically significant) negative correlation between the EFS and 
optimism. 
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Table 10 
Correlations between the EFS and related and unrelated scales. 
Construct  r 
Convergent validity  
   Defensive pessimism .39** 
   Cognitive flexibility .17* 
Discriminant validity  
   Coping flexibility (EC subscale) .10(ns) 
   Coping flexibility (AC subscale) .06(ns) 
   Internal locus of control -.02(ns) 
   Social desirability -.26** 
   Optimism -.25** 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Brief Discussion 
The moderate positive correlation between expectancy flexibility and defensive 
pessimism came as no surprise. It is important to note, however, that the correlation was 
not so high as to suggest that expectancy flexibility is synonymous with defensive 
pessimism. This finding suggests that expectancy flexibility has considerable conceptual 
overlap with defensive pessimism while still remaining a distinct construct. Thus, the 
moderate magnitude of the correlation provides support for both convergent and 
discriminant validity. This can be explained using the framework outlined above; that is, 
expectancy flexibility primarily differs from defensive pessimism in that it is a trait rather 
than a strategy. People who score high on expectancy flexibility may engage in defensive 
pessimism as a strategy, while still allowing for the possibility that they may also raise 
their expectations under some circumstances. 
There was no significant correlation between expectancy flexibility and locus of control. 
This finding suggests that one’s locus of control has little to do with the amount of 
flexibility one has. Individuals who have an internal locus of control were no more 
flexible than people who have an external locus of control. 
As expected, there was no significant correlation between expectancy flexibility 
and either subscale of coping flexibility. It seems that these constructs have little in 
common except for having the word “flexibility” in their name. In addition, there was 
only a modest positive correlation between expectancy flexibility and cognitive 
flexibility. While this is evidence for construct validity, these findings suggest that 
expectancy flexibility is not redundant with other types of flexibility that already exist in 
the literature.  
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Unexpectedly, there was a small negative correlation between expectancy 
flexibility and social desirability. People who scored high on expectancy flexibility 
tended to score low on social desirability. In contrast, expectancy inflexibility tends to be 
associated with social desirability. Although this finding was unexpected, in hindsight it 
was unsurprising. Flexible people are probably less prone to attempt to make a good 
impression and/or deceive themselves. Instead, they try to see things (including 
themselves) as they really are rather than how they want them to be. Meanwhile, 
individuals scoring low on flexibility (particularly inflexible optimists) are likely prone to 
self-deception (Wallston, 1994). 
The significant negative correlation between expectancy flexibility and optimism 
was also unexpected. While they are distinct constructs, expectancy flexibility is related 
to pessimism. However, it should be emphasized that the effect size of this association is 
quite small. The significance of the association is in part due to the large sample size; or 
as stated by Furr and Bacharach (2013): “If the correlation is small but the sample is quite 
large, then the results might not indicate poor discriminant validity” (p. 267).  
It should be noted that this finding appears to dispel the notion of pessimists as 
being rigid and inflexible. Instead, pessimists are generally more flexible than their 
optimistic counterparts. This suggests that expectancy flexibility resembles a mild, 
healthy form of pessimism that differs from the pathological form of pessimism measured 
by the LOT-R. Examination of the scatterplot in Figure 6 suggests that flexible optimists, 
flexible pessimists, inflexible pessimists, and inflexible optimists are approximately 
equally common.  
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Figure 6. Scatterplot showing the association between expectancy flexibility (X axis) and 
optimism (Y axis). 
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Even with five items added, the reliability of the scale was still lower than .70 
(albeit very close). One plausible explanation for this low reliability is that the context of 
the items could have influenced the respondents’ responses to the items (Knowles, 1988; 
Parducci, 1968). That is, the content of the other items not included in the final EFS scale 
could have suppressed the overall reliability of the item included in the final EFS scale. 
Thus, these items were removed when the scale was administered to participants in Study 
3. 
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Study 3 
A new study was conducted to assess whether receiving negative feedback would 
lead to a shift in participants’ expectations. Participants were given a brief academic 
vignette, where they were asked to imagine how they expect to perform on an upcoming 
exam. They were also given a brief gambling vignette, where they were asked to imagine 
how they would respond in a simple gambling scenario (no gambling experience was 
required to respond to this vignette). The objective of this study was to examine whether 
people who scored high on expectancy flexibility are more likely to react to negative 
feedback by raising or lowering their expectations (compared to people scoring low on 
expectancy flexibility). 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred students were recruited in the Fall semester of 2015 
from the University of Windsor’s Department of Psychology Participant Pool. Seven 
participants were removed from the dataset because of large quantities of missing data, 
which resulted in a final sample of 193. One hundred and fifty one females (78%) and 42 
males (22%) participated in this study (none of the participants identified as transgender 
or did not indicate their gender). The mean age was 21.06 (range = 18 to 40). The ethnic 
characteristics of the sample were as follows, in descending order of frequency: White / 
European (n = 122, 63%), Middle Eastern (n = 18, 9%), Black / African / Caribbean (n = 
15, 8%), South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (n = 12, 6%), East Asian / Chinese / Japanese (n 
= 9, 5%), Bi / Multiracial (n = 8, 4%), “Other” (n = 5, 3%), Latin / South American (n = 
2, 1%), First Nations/Aboriginal (n = 2, 1%). 
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Measures. Participants completed the EFS, LOT-R, an academic-related vignette, 
a gambling-related vignette and a basic demographics questionnaire. The EFS and LOT-
R have been described before; the vignettes are explained in detail below.  
Academic vignette. Participants were asked the following question: “Imagine 
that you are taking a midterm test in a course in your major.  You have prepared in your 
usual way for taking the test.  What percentage grade do you expect that you will receive 
on this midterm test?” Participants were given six response options, in increments of 10 
points. On the next page, all participants received feedback that was 10 points lower than 
they had expected (for example, participants who indicated that they would get a 75, 
would get ‘feedback’ that said they had received a 65). Participants were then asked, 
“Imagine that you received a grade of [a number 10 points lower than expected] on this 
midterm test. How do you think you would do on the next exam in this course?” 
Participants were given the same response options described above. 
Gambling vignette. In the Gambling Vignette, participants were asked to respond 
to this hypothetical scenario: “Imagine that you are in a casino playing the slot machines. 
You have $40 to gamble with. Each pull is $1 (if you win, you win a dollar; if you lose, 
you lose a dollar). Estimate how much you will be up (have more money than you 
originally started with) or down (have less money than you originally started with) after 
30 pulls.” Participants were given the following response options: “Up by $20”, “Up by 
$10”, “Neither up or down”, “Down by $10”, or “Down by $20.” Participants were 
randomly directed to one of five situations. “After 30 pulls, you are now [x]. Please 
estimate by how much you will be “up” or “down” after an additional 30 pulls.”  (in the 
brackets, one of the following five scenarios would appear: “up by $20”, “up to $10”, 
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“Neither up or down”, “Down by $10”, or “Down by $20”). Participants were given the 
same response options described above. 
Procedure. After clearance was obtained from the Research Ethics Board of the 
University of Windsor, data collection began. Participants for this study were recruited 
through the University of Windsor Psychology Department Participant Pool, which 
hosted the Study Advertisement. Participants completed the survey online, using 
FluidSurveys software.  
Individuals who chose to participate in the study were directed to the Letter of 
Information page. In the Letter of Information, participants were informed of the purpose 
of the study, procedure, right to confidentiality, and right to withdraw from the study. 
Participants indicated their consent to participate in the study by clicking “I agree to 
participate” at the bottom of the page, which directed them to the survey. Participants 
who clicked “I do not agree to participate” did not continue to the survey, and were 
directed to the exit page. 
Participants completed several questionnaires online. These measures included 
the EFS, LOT-R, an academic-related vignette, a gambling-related vignette and a basic 
demographics questionnaire, which were described in the previous section. Participants 
were given one of two different versions of the survey. The order of the questionnaires 
was counterbalanced, so that some participants saw the vignettes first, and the self-report 
questionnaires second. Other participants saw the self-report questionnaires first, and the 
vignettes second. 
Upon completing the survey, participants received 1 bonus point for their 
participation, which could be used toward any Psychology or Business course that 
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accepted bonus points. Participants were taken to a separate page (also hosted on 
FluidSurveys) that asked participants to provide their name for the purpose of assigning 
bonus points (identifying information was stored in a dataset separate from the rest of the 
data to protect participant confidentiality). After providing their names, participants were 
thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Separate analyses were conducted for the two administration formats; no 
noticeable differences in the results were found between the two methods. Thus, the 
findings presented here combine data collected using both methods. 
In the academic scenario, a new variable was calculated by subtracting the post-
feedback expectation scores from the pre-feedback expectation scores. Individuals were 
divided into two groups; those who changed their expectations were coded as 1, and 
those who did not change their expectations were coded as 0. Those who changed their 
expectations were called “flexible” (n = 59) and those who did not change their 
expectations were called “inflexible” (n = 134). An independent samples t-test found no 
differences in flexibility (as measured by the EFS) between the two groups (t = .028, p = 
ns). 
For the gambling scenario, only participants who indicated that they had some 
experience gambling were included in the analyses. Out of the initial sample of 193, 93 
participants (48%) had gambling experience. A series of regressions were conducted, 
using only the 93 participants with gambling experience. The pre-feedback score, 
optimism scores, and expectancy flexibility scores were entered as independent predictor 
variables. Of greatest interest was the association between flexibility and post-feedback 
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gambling expectation scores. Optimism was included as a covariate to demonstrate that it 
was not related to post-feedback gambling expectation scores (as would be expected, 
given that optimists ought to have high expectations regardless of feedback). The pre-
feedback score was also included as a covariate. The five groups’ post-feedback 
gambling expectation scores served as the dependent variable in each regression.  
For the loss of $20 group, there was a marginally-significant association between 
flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = -.44, t = -1.94, p = 
.07). No such association was found for optimism (β = .31, t = 1.14, p = ns) or pre-
feedback expectations (β = -.02, t = -.07, p = ns). 
For the loss of $10 group, there was no significant association between 
expectancy flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = -.22, t = -
.78, p = ns). In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-feedback 
gambling expectation scores and optimism (β = -.04, t = -.17, p = ns) or pre-feedback 
expectations (β = -.38, t = 1.31, p = ns).  
For the “no change” group, there was a strong significant association between 
flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = .63, t = 3.69, p < .01). 
In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-feedback gambling 
expectation scores and optimism (β = -.20, t = -1.19, p = ns) or pre-feedback expectations 
(β = -.15, t = .87, p = ns). 
For the “gain of $10” group, there was a significant positive association between 
expectancy flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = .44, t = 
2.05, p = .05). In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-
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feedback gambling expectation scores and optimism (β = .37, t = 1.68, p = ns) or pre-
feedback expectations (β = .04, t = .17, p = ns). 
For the “gain of $20” group, there was unexpectedly no significant association 
between flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = .10, t = .42, p 
= ns). In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-feedback 
gambling expectation scores and optimism (β = .01, t = .04, p = ns) or pre-feedback 
expectations (β = .30, t = -1.24, p = ns). 
Brief Discussion 
The findings from the gambling scenario (but not the academic scenario) 
supported the idea that shifts in expectations do occur in response to negative 
information, and that these shifts are associated with expectancy flexibility. The findings 
also demonstrate the complex nature of gambling cognitions. The increase in 
expectations for the “gain of $10” group and decrease in expectations for the “loss of 
$20” group were unsurprising.  However, there were some unexpected findings. 
The lack of association between expectancy flexibility and post-feedback 
expectations was unexpected. In hindsight, it is not surprising that this occurred. A 
slightly negative result would come as no surprise to gamblers, since it is expected that 
the “odds favour the house”. 
Similarly, the positive association between expectancy flexibility and post-feedback 
expectations for the “no change” group was not anticipated. But because people tend to 
be slightly pessimistic about gambling (the odds are stacked in favor of the house), even a 
neutral outcome may raise gamblers’ hopes. 
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Another unanticipated finding was the lack of association between expectancy 
flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores for the “gain of $20” 
group, when one includes optimism and pre-feedback expectations in the same model. 
After all, one would expect such a positive outcome to be accompanied by an increase in 
one’s expectations. I speculate that this is because the participants interpreted such 
particularly good fortune as a singular event. This is called the gambler’s fallacy (Ayton 
& Fischer, 2004), which is the belief that if an outcome (e.g. a win) happens frequently, it 
will be balanced out by the opposite outcome (e.g. a loss) in the future. In the gambler’s 
fallacy, a large win may be treated as a rare instance of good luck, and individuals may 
think that they will not be so lucky next time. 
However, the fact that no pattern of differences was found in the academic 
scenario suggests that a shift in expectations may not occur in all contexts. In the 
academic scenario, there was no change in expectations that was associated with 
expectancy flexibility. It is reasonable to speculate that other processes may operate in 
academic contexts to influence grade expectations (Svanum & Bigatti, 2006). For 
example, students may feel that their exam grade on an individual exam may have little 
influence on their overall grade for the course because there are usually several exams or 
assignments during a semester. With these findings in mind, the final study was 
conducted. 
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Study 4 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and fifty undergraduate students were recruited using 
the University of Windsor’s Department of Psychology Participant Pool in the 
Spring/Summer semesters of 2016. Participants were recruited from pool-eligible courses 
in Psychology and Business. One hundred ninety one females (76.4%) and 58 males 
(23.2%) participated in this study. None of the participants identified as transgender and 
one participant did not indicate their gender. The mean age of the sample was 21.72, 
ranging from 17 to 56. The total number of participants identifying as a particular ethnic 
group was as follows, in descending order of frequency: 134 identified as White / 
European (53.6%), 30 identified as Middle Eastern (12.0%), 22 identified as East Asian / 
Chinese / Japanese (8.8%), 21 identified as Black / African / Caribbean (8.4%), 16 
identified as South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (6.4%), 13 identified as Bi / Multiracial 
(5.2%), two identified as Aboriginal/Metis/First Nations (0.8%), and one identified as 
Latin / South American (0.4%). Eleven participants identified as “Other” (4.4%). 
Measures. The measures that were used in this study are shown below in Table 
11. With the exceptions of the Expectancy Flexibility Scale and qualitative questions, 
each scale is an existing measure. The scales are described in more detail below. 
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Table 11 
Measures Completed by Participants in Study 4 
Scale name # of items Citation 
Academic Coping Strategies Scale 
(ACSS) 
56 Sullivan (2010) 
Adolescent Invulnerability Scale 
(AIS) 
21 Lapsley and Duggan (2001) 
Academic Success Inventory for 
College Students (ASICS) 
50 Prevatt et al. (2011) 
Expectancy Flexibility Scale       
(EFS) 
14 New scale 
Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire 
(GBQ) 
21 Steenbergh, Meyers, May, and 
Whelan (2002) 
Life Orientation Test-Revised      
(LOT-R) 
10 Scheier, Carver, and Bridges 
(1994) 
Multidimensional Health Behavior 
Inventory (MHBI) 
56 Kulbok, Carter, Baldwin, 
Gilmartin, and Kirkwood 
(1999) 
Problem Gambling Severity Index 
(PGSI) 
Qualitative items 
9 
 
7 
Ferris and Wynne (2001) 
 
New scale 
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Demographics. The participants will be asked to provide their age, gender, ethnic 
identity, and year of study. The scale is shown in Appendix J. 
Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS). The EFS was created for the purpose of this 
dissertation. The development and validation of this scale is described in Studies 1 and 2. 
The final form of the scale can be found in Appendix E. 
Academic Coping Strategies Scale (ACSS). The ACSS is a self-report measure 
of how students respond to an academic stressor – namely, receiving a grade that was 
lower than they had anticipated (Sullivan, 2010). The ACSS is composed of 56 items (22 
are filler items that do not load on any subscale). Each item describes a behavioural or 
cognitive coping strategy. Respondents are asked to indicate how often they use this 
strategy in this context, using a Likert scale (1 = almost never, 5 = almost always). The 
ACSS has three subscales: Approach (15 items), Avoidance (11 items), and Social 
Support (8 items). Sullivan (2010) reported good internal consistency reliability for all 
three subscales: Approach (α = .91), Avoidance (α = .82), and Social Support (α = .81). 
The ACSS can be found in Appendix B. 
Adolescent Invulnerability Scale (AIS). The Adolescent Invulnerability Scale is 
a 21-item self-report measure of personal perceptions of invulnerability (Lapsley & 
Duggan, 2001). Individuals respond to the AIS items using a 5-point Likert scale that 
ranges from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The scale has been validated in 
both adolescent and young adult samples (Duggan, Lapsley, & Norman, 2000). In the 
young adult sample (with a mean age of 21.85 years), the authors reported a two-factor 
solution. The first factor was a twelve-item “danger invulnerability” subscale (α = .85), 
which represented individuals’ invulnerability to external danger. A second factor, a 
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nine-item “psychological invulnerability” subscale (α = .79) measured invulnerability to 
psychological distress. In this young adult sample, scores on both subscales were 
positively correlated with risk behaviors (Duggan et al., 2000). The AIS can be found in 
Appendix C. 
Academic Success Inventory for College Students (ASICS). The ASICS was 
developed as a holistic measure of student success (Prevatt, Li, Welles, Festa-Dreher, 
Yelland, & Lee, 2011). Most studies operationalize student success as grade point 
average (GPA); however, GPA has been criticized as being a limited way of predicting 
academic outcomes (Pritchard & Wilson, 2003; Robbins et al., 2004). To address this 
limitation, the ASICS was developed to efficiently measure several psychosocial 
predictors of positive academic outcomes identified by previous research (Astin, 1998; 
Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harackiewicz, Barron, Pintrich, Elliot, & Thrash, 2002; Tinto, 1998; 
Weiner, 1985). The ASICS has 50 items, and is divided into 10 subscales: General 
academic skills, Internal motivation, Perceived instructor efficacy, Confidence, External 
motivation, Socializing, Career decidedness, Lack of anxiety, Personal adjustment, and 
Self-Regulation. In general, higher scores on each subscale meant greater amounts of that 
construct (with the exception of socializing, where higher scores mean less engagement 
in negative social behaviours, i.e. partying). Each item is rated on a Likert scale that 
ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  The internal consistency 
reliability of the ASICS subscales was generally good (i.e. α > .70), except for the 
External Motivation/Current subscale, which had a Cronbach’s α of .62 (Prevatt et al., 
2011). The ASICS can be found in Appendix D. 
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Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ). The GBQ is a self-report measure of 
gamblers’ cognitive distortions that was developed by Steenbergh, Meyers, May, and 
Whelan (2002). The GBQ consists of 21 items, and each item is rated on a Likert scale 
that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In the original study, the 
authors included non-gamblers, because “gambling status does not dictate the presence or 
absence of gambling-related irrational beliefs” (Steenbergh et al., 2002, p. 144). The 
GBQ has two subscales: the 13-item Luck/Perseverance subscale, which reflects the 
belief that people can make their own good luck if they just keep trying, and the 8-item 
Illusion of Control subscale, which reflects the belief that one’s behaviour can influence 
chance occurrences. The Luck/Perseverance subscale contains items such as “If I am 
gambling and losing, I should continue because I don’t want to miss a win”. In contrast, 
the Illusion of Control scale includes items such as “My knowledge and skill in gambling 
contribute to the likelihood that I will make money.” These statements resemble the 
beliefs of optimistic gamblers (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Both the 
Luck/Perseverance subscale (α = .90) and the Illusion of Control subscale (α = .84) had 
good internal consistency reliability. The GBQ can be found in Appendix F. 
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R). The LOT-R was developed by 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) to measure dispositional optimism. The LOT-R 
consists of six scored items and four filler items. Three of the scored items measure 
optimism, and the other three items measure pessimism. An example of an item 
measuring optimism is: “Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”. 
An example of an item measuring pessimism is: “If something can go wrong for me, it 
will”. Participants respond to these items using a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from 
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“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). The three pessimism items are reverse-
scored. Higher scores on the scale mean greater optimism. The six items of LOT-R had a 
Cronbach’s α of .78, suggesting good internal consistency reliability (Scheier et al., 
1994). The LOT-R can be found in Appendix G. 
Multidimensional Health Behavior Inventory (MHBI). The Multidimensional 
Health Behavior Inventory was developed to measure young adults’ healthy and risky 
behaviors (Kulbok, Carter, Baldwin, Gilmartin & Kirkwood, 1999). The MHBI was 
chosen because it was developed to be used with a young adult population and taps a 
wide variety of health domains (most health questionnaires are designed for people with 
chronic or serious illnesses). The MHBI consists of 58 items, and participants indicate the 
relative frequency that they engage in a behaviour using a Likert scale that ranges from 1 
(almost never) to 5 (almost always). The MHBI has seven subscales relating to checkup 
behaviours (10 items), dietary behaviours (13 items), exercise behaviours (4 items), 
safety behaviours (9 items), social behaviours (6 items), stress behaviours (6 items), and 
substance use behaviours (10 items). The authors state that the scale is intended to 
measure different dimensions of health promotion behaviour, not as a summative scale. A 
pair of gender-specific items on the Checkup subscale that pertained to breast self-
examination (for females) and testicular self-examination (for males) were not included 
in the present study. All subscales are coded such that higher scores mean higher 
functioning (this is of particular relevance to the Substance Use and Stress subscales). 
Kulbok et al. (1999) reported that the internal consistency reliability of all seven 
subscales were within the acceptable range, from α = .74 (for the Social subscale) to α = 
.88 (for the Diet subscale). The MHBI can be found in Appendix H. 
 A Glass Half Full    87 
 
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). The PGSI was developed by as part 
of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). The PGSI consists of 
nine items that measure behaviours that suggest a problem with gambling (e.g. betting 
more than one could afford), and adverse consequences (e.g. feelings of guilt or financial 
problems). Individuals respond to PGSI items using a 4-point Likert scale, with anchors 
of ‘never’ (0), ‘sometimes’ (1), ‘most of the time’ (2), or ‘almost always’ (3). The PGSI 
is designed to be used in general population samples, rather than for use in a clinical 
context. Ferris and Wynne (2001) reported good internal consistency reliability (α = .84). 
The PGSI can be found in Appendix I. 
Qualitative items. A set of seven items was used to tap into participants’ thought 
processes. These items were developed based on previous research on shifts in 
expectations (e.g., Carroll, Sweeny, & Shepperd, 2006). Participants were asked to 
respond to the following questions: 1) “When something bad happens that you don't 
expect, does this influence your expectations of the future?  If so, how?”, 2) “If you get a 
bad grade, do your expectations for your grade on the next test change?  If so, how?”, 3) 
“How does getting a bad grade change your behaviour for the next exam?”, 4) “When the 
outcome an upcoming future event is uncertain, how optimistic or pessimistic are you 
about what will happen?”, 5) “When something happens that far exceeds your 
expectations, how does this affect your expectations of the future?”, 6) “When you feel in 
control of the outcome, how does this affect your expectations of the future?”, and 7) 
“When something unusually good or unusually bad happens, how does this affect your 
expectations of the future?” 
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Procedure. Prior to collecting data, clearance from the Research Ethics Board of 
the University of Windsor was obtained. Participants were recruited through the 
University of Windsor Psychology Department Participant Pool. Participants participated 
in the study online by clicking on a link provided in the Study Advertisement hosted on 
the Participant Pool website.  
Individuals who chose to click on the link to the study were directed to the Letter 
of Information page (shown in Appendix A). The Letter of Information informed 
participants of the purpose of the study, procedure, right to confidentiality, and right to 
withdraw from the study. After reading the Letter of Information, participants could 
indicate their consent to participate in the study by clicking “I agree to participate” at the 
bottom of the page. This link directed them to the survey, which was hosted on 
FluidSurveys.com. Participants who opted to click “I do not agree to participate” were 
not allowed to continue to the survey, and were instead directed to an exit page. 
All of the questionnaires listed in the Measures section were administered. 
Participants completed the ACSS, ASICS, AIS, EFS, GBQ, LOT-R, MHBI, PGSI, the 
qualitative items, and a brief demographics questionnaire. On average, it took 47 minutes 
for participants to complete the survey. Upon completing the survey, participants 
received 1 bonus point for their participation, which could be used toward any course in 
Psychology or Business that accepted bonus points.  
After completing the survey, participants were taken to a separate page (also 
hosted on FluidSurveys) that asked participants to provide their name for the purpose of 
assigning bonus points. To protect participant confidentiality, this identifying information 
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was stored in a dataset separate from the rest of the data. After providing their names, 
participants were thanked for their participation. 
Data analyses. Prior to conducting the data analyses, the data were inspected for 
missing values. Missing data were replaced using a multiple imputation technique. 
Descriptive data (such as means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis) will be 
presented for all study variables. Correlational analyses will focus on expectancy 
flexibility, optimism, and cognitive flexibility. All analyses will be performed using 
SPSS version 24.  
The data analyses tested the hypotheses described earlier. The mediated 
moderation and moderated mediation were tested using SPSS PROCESS macros 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, 2013) designed to estimate indirect effects in simple 
mediation models. The SPSS macros included a series of regression analyses to test the 
requirements for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The method developed by Preacher 
and Hayes (2004) was chosen because it is considered to be superior to the traditional 
procedures for testing mediational analyses developed by Baron and Kenny (1986) and 
Sobel (1982). The Baron and Kenny method has been criticized because it is prone to 
both Type I and Type II error, it does not directly address the mediation hypothesis, and 
has low statistical power (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The Sobel method has also been 
criticized because it requires several assumptions that are rarely met; i.e. a large sample 
and that the sampling distributions for mediation paths be normally distributed (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004). The model developed by Preacher and Hayes improves upon these 
methods by using a bootstrapping procedure. Bootstrapping is a non-parametric method 
that can take a large number of samples (e.g. 1,000) from the raw data of a sample size 
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equal to the original sample size and computes estimates of the indirect effect for each 
sample. The bootstrapping macro computes an estimate of the indirect effect, an 
estimated standard error for the effect, and the 95% and 99% confidence intervals for the 
population value of the indirect effect.  
To test the hypotheses, the independent variable (optimism) and the moderator 
(expectancy flexibility) were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). Centering was performed 
because it resolves the problem of multicollinearity between the independent variable, 
moderator, and the interaction terms without affecting the level of significance of the 
interaction terms or the simple slopes of regression lines. To center, the sample mean is 
subtracted from all participants’ scores, which results in a variable mean of zero. The 
interaction variable was calculated by multiplying the centered optimism and expectancy 
flexibility variables together (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). 
Three models were tested. In each analysis, optimism served as the independent 
variable. In the first model, problem gambling served as the dependent variable. The 
Luck/Perseverance subscale of the GBQ served as the mediator, and expectancy 
flexibility served as the moderator.  In the second model, preventative health behaviors 
(as measured by the seven subscales of the MHBI) served as the dependent variable. For 
the purposes of this analysis, the Danger Invulnerability subscale of the AIS served as the 
mediator, and expectancy flexibility served as the moderator.  In the third model, the ten 
subscales of the ASICS served as the dependent variable. For the purposes of this 
analysis, academic approach coping served as the mediator, and expectancy flexibility 
served as the moderator.   
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Results 
Data cleaning. Prior to data analysis, data were examined for response patterns 
that were contradictory or inattentive (endorsing “strongly agree” to both optimism and 
pessimism items). No cases met these criteria. Missing values were identified using 
Missing Values Analysis. Less than 5% of data were missing. Using Little’s MCAR test, 
it was determined that these data were missing completely at random, χ2(4791) = 843.02, 
p = ns. Missing data were imputed using the multiple imputation technique available in 
SPSS.  
Data were then examined for potential violations of the assumptions of multiple 
regression. To test the assumption of normality, skewness and kurtosis were calculated 
for each study variable. The acceptable range for skewness is between -3 and 3 and the 
acceptable range for kurtosis is between -7 and 7 (Kline, 2005). For every variable except 
PGSI, skewness and kurtosis were found to be within the acceptable range. To test the 
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity, residual scatterplots were analyzed. These 
scatterplots showed that the data met these assumptions. Next, outliers were identified. 
Univariate outliers were those that were less than z = -3.29 or greater than z = 3.29. 
Multivariate outliers were those with a Mahalanobis’ distance that was significant (p < 
.001), and influential observations were those for which Cook’s distance > 1 and 
standardized DFFITS > 2 (Stevens, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The assumption of 
multicollinearity was tested by examining Tolerance and VIF statistics. Tolerance scores 
less than .10 or VIF scores greater than 10 would indicate a violation of this assumption 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Lastly, the assumption of independence of errors 
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was tested by examining the Durbin-Watson statistic, which should be greater than 1 and 
less than 3 (Field, 2005). 
Basic demographic statistics. Means, standard deviations, floor, ceiling, 
skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach’s α are reported for each scale and subscale in Table 
12. Floor and ceiling scores show the percentage of participants scoring at the theoretical 
minimum and maximum for the scale. Floors were scores associated with low 
functioning and negative well-being; ceilings were scores associated with high 
functioning and positive well-being. To test for possible gender differences, a set of t-
tests was run for each study variable using gender (male/female) as the independent 
variable. 
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Table 12 
Basic descriptive statistics for Study 4 
Variable 
 
Mean (SD) Floor Ceiling Skew Kurt α 
ACSS – approach 51.57 
(10.20) 
0 0 -.36 .64 .92 
ACSS – avoidance 30.58 (6.69) 0 0 .14 -.34 .82 
ACSS - social support 23.34 (6.27) 1.6 0 -.13 -.24 .83 
AIS-danger invulnerability 25.73 (7.03) 0 2.0 .64 1.16 .85 
AIS-psych. invulnerability 20.12 (6.22) 0 2.8 .21 -.28 .87 
ASICS-General academic 
skills 
42.06 
(11.22) 
0.4 2.4 -.22 -.34 .91 
ASICS-Instructor efficacy 19.40 (7.56) 2.0 0.8 .04 -.84 .87 
ASICS-Career decidedness 20.30 (5.73) 0 10.8 .44 -.76 .82 
ASICS-External motivation 20.06 (5.21)   -.52 -.13 .81 
ASICS-Confidence 28.78 (7.04) 0.8 2.0 -.53 .32 .85 
ASICS-Personal adjustment 11.16 (4.85) 5.6 4.0 .24 -.82 .87 
ASICS-Self regulation 18.26 (5.92) 0.4 0.4 .25 -.24 .78 
ASICS-Socializing 25.90 (6.73) 0 6.4 -.61 -.40 .80 
ASICS-Internal motivation 26.09 (6.73) 0.4 1.2 -.23 -.56 .86 
ASICS-Lack of anxiety 26.09 (8.09) 13.2 0 .71 .14 .78 
Cognitive Flexibility Scale 53.11 (6.59) 0 0 .04 -.53 .76 
Expectancy Flexibility Scale 51.47 (5.80) 0 0.8 .04 .92 .76 
GBQ-Luck/Perseverance 28.45 
(15.53) 
0 27.2 .83 -.25 .96 
GBQ-Illusion of Control 21.01 
(10.38) 
0 20.0 .34 -.86 .90 
LOT-R 18.72 (4.27) 1.2 0.4 -.57 .56 .80 
MHBI-Diet 39.30 (8.74) 0 0 .04 .05 .84 
MHBI-Substance Use 42.89 (6.21) 0 10.8 -.87 -.24 .77 
MHBI-Safety/Environment 24.86 (6.33) 0 0.8 .41 .48 .80 
MHBI-Checkup 22.24 (6.67) 0.8 0.8 .14 -.33 .85 
MHBI-Social 21.28 (4.11) 0 3.6 .04 -.12 .75 
MHBI-Stress/Rest 19.22 (4.30) 0 1.2 .21 -.12 .82 
MHBI-Exercise 12.41 (3.98) 0.8 4.4 .07 -.79 .84 
PGSI 1.31 (3.36) 0 76.4 3.12 9.62 .93 
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Gender differences were found for the following variables: AIS-danger 
invulnerability, AIS-psychological vulnerability, PGSI, ASICS-social support, ASICS-
skills, ASICS-career decidedness, ASICS-socializing, ASICS-lack of anxiety, GBQ-luck, 
GBQ-illusion of control, MHBI-social. Males scored higher than females on danger 
invulnerability, t (78.74) = 4.52, p < .01; psychological invulnerability, t (247) = 4.89, p 
< .01; PGSI, t (75.04) = 2.68, p < .01; ASICS-lack of anxiety, t (247) = 3.36, p < .01; 
GBQ-luck, t (247) = 4.65, p < .01; and GBQ-illusion of control, t (247) = 4.09, p < .01. 
Females scored higher than males on ASICS-social support, t (247) = 2.29, p < .05; 
ASICS-skills, t (247) = 2.79, p < .01; ASICS-career decidedness, t (247) = 2.04, p < .05; 
ASICS-socializing, t (247) = 3.75, p < .01; and MHBI-social, t (247) = 3.04, p < .01. 
Outliers. Analysis of z scores showed that there were several univariate outliers, 
i.e. z scores greater than 3.29 or less than -3.29. There were seven participants with z 
scores greater than 3.29 on the PGSI, one participant with a z score less than -3.29 on the 
ACSS approach subscale, and one participant with a z score greater than 3.29 on the 
danger invulnerability subscale of the AIS. Analyses were run with and without outliers 
removed. The analyses showed only slight differences (likely due to the fact that the 
outliers did not greatly exceed the cutoff of |3.29|); the results shown here are without 
outliers removed. 
Internal consistency reliability. Variables were also examined for internal 
consistency reliability. Cronbach’s α values greater than .70 were deemed acceptable. As 
shown in Table 12, every variable exceeded this threshold (notably, including the EFS). 
Overall, these values were similar to those reported in previous studies (Sullivan, 2010; 
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Lapsley & Duggan, 2001; Prevatt et al., 2011; Steenbergh et al., 2002; Scheier et al., 
1994; Kulbok et al., 1999; Ferris & Wynne, 2001). 
Correlational analyses. Tables 13 and 14 show the Pearson correlations between 
all of the variables used in this study for all participants. Of greatest interest were the 
correlations between expectancy flexibility and optimism with the other variables. 
Correlations between cognitive flexibility and all other study variables were also 
examined for comparison purposes. Separate correlational analyses were conducted with 
males and females only; however, there were no substantial differences in magnitude or 
direction of association (although many associations were non-significant in the male-
only sample; this is likely due to the smaller sample size). 
 
 A Glass Half Full    96 
 
Table 13 
Correlation matrix among predictor, mediator, and moderator variables 
 
 EFS LOT-R CFS ACSS AIS GBQ 
        APP AVO SS DI PI LP IOC 
EFS 1          
LOT-R -0.109 1         
CFS .218** .326** 1        
ACSS approach .160* .306** .444** 1       
ACSS avoidance -0.006 -.292** -.332** -.425** 1      
ACSS social support 0.098 0.016 0.121 .373** -.234** 1     
AIS Danger invulnerability -0.087 -0.022 -.208** -0.098 .252** -0.119 1    
AIS Psychological invulnerability -0.043 .272** .190** .146* 0.037 -.147* .429** 1   
GBQ Luck/Perseverance -.134* 0.005 -.286** -0.023 .135* -0.036 .457** .166** 1  
GBQ Illusion of control -0.003 -0.019 -.229** 0.027 .152* -0.024 .365** .132* .819** 1 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 14  
Correlations between EFS and dependent variables  
  
MHBI   ASICS 
 
  EFS  DIET SUB SAFE CHK SOC STR EXR SKI EFF CAR EXT CNF PA SR SOC INT LAX PGSI  
EFS 1 
                  
MHBI diet 0.105 1 
                 
MHBI substance .145* 0.084 1 
                
MHBI safety 0.043 .425** 0.069 1 
               
MHBI checkup 0.062 .379** 0.086 .644** 1 
              
MHBI social .161* .126* 0.085 .277** .334** 1 
             
MHBI stress 0.101 .202** .146* .316** .311** .470** 1 
            
MHBI exercise 0.058 .540** 0.029 .339** .251** .278** .374** 1 
           
ASICS skills .181** .177** .274** .356** .298** .295** .245** .297** 1 
          
ASICS efficacy -0.059 0.01 -0.04 0 0.023 0.04 -0.028 -0.006 0.017 1 
         
ASICS career 0.066 0.032 .192** .130* 0.114 .233** 0.035 .124* .393** 0.118 1 
        
ASICS external .146* 0.021 .160* .142* 0.089 .140* -0.027 0.092 .474** .178** .344** 1 
       
ASICS confidence .217** 0.085 .193** .157* .165** .251** .275** .258** .531** 0.094 .388** .525** 1 
      
ASICS personal adj. -0.037 0.026 .131* 0.016 0.06 0.056 .219** 0.092 0.092 0.057 .127* -.175** 0.011 1 
     
ASICS self-reg. -0.031 0.114 0.104 .283** .126* 0.117 .240** .203** .558** 0.12 .194** .317** .403** 0.12 1 
    
ASICS socializing -0.033 0.063 .584** 0.058 0.053 -0.049 -0.02 -0.04 .338** 0.087 .221** 0.087 0.109 .252** .267** 1 
   
ASICS internal -0.004 0.063 0.059 .225** 0.123 .150* 0.08 .162* .466** .481** .294** .561** .551** -0.106 .522** .130* 1 
  
ASICS lack of anx. -.273** -0.114 -.183** -.156* -.167** -.199** 0.054 0.003 -.235** .126* -.167** -.213** -0.085 .191** 0.116 -0.086 -0.036 1 
 
PGSI -.182** 0.044 -.411** 0.093 0.066 -.170** 0.009 -0.008 -.147* -0.038 -.126* -0.124 -0.078 -0.023 -0.023 -.266** -0.01 .175** 1 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Expectancy flexibility was positively correlated with three ASICS subscales: 
General Academic Skills (r = .18, p < .05), External Motivation (r = .15, p < .05), and 
Confidence (r = .22, p < .01), and was negatively correlated with the ASICS Lack of 
Anxiety subscale (r = .27, p < .01). However, expectancy flexibility was not significantly 
correlated with the other six subscales of the ASICS (i.e., Personal Adjustment, Self-
regulation, Socializing, Instructor Efficacy, Career Decidedness, or Internal Motivation).  
Expectancy flexibility was positively correlated with two MHBI subscales: 
Substance Use (r = .14, p < .05), and Social Health (r = .16, p < .05); however, it was not 
significantly correlated with the other five subscales of the MHBI. Expectancy flexibility 
was only significantly correlated with one of three ACSS subscales, i.e. Approach coping 
(r = .16, p < .05). Expectancy flexibility was negatively correlated with PGSI scores (r = 
-.18, p < .01) and luck beliefs in gambling (r = -.13, p < .05), but was uncorrelated with 
illusion of control beliefs in gambling. 
Optimism was positively correlated with five ASICS subscales, including 
confidence, personal adjustment, self-regulation, socializing, and lack of anxiety. No 
significant correlation was found between optimism and the other ASICS subscales (i.e., 
skills, instructor efficacy, career decidedness, external, or internal). Optimism was 
positively correlated with cognitive flexibility. Optimism was positively correlated with 
ACSS approach coping and negatively correlated with ACSS avoidance coping, but 
uncorrelated with ACSS social support. Optimism was also positively correlated with 
three MHBI subscales, including (lack of) substance use, social health, and (lack of) 
stress, but uncorrelated with exercise, safety, checkup, or diet behaviours. Optimism was 
positively correlated with psychological invulnerability, but uncorrelated with danger 
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invulnerability. Optimism was not significantly correlated with any of the gambling-
related measures. 
Mediational/moderational analyses. It was hypothesized that luck/perseverance 
would mediate the relationship between optimism and problem gambling such that higher 
levels of optimism would lead to higher levels of luck/perseverance, which in turn would 
lead to higher levels of problem gambling. It was also hypothesized that expectancy 
flexibility would moderate the association between optimism and luck/perseverance. That 
is, people scoring high on expectancy flexibility would exhibit a smaller association 
between optimism and luck/perseverance. 
Baron and Kenny (1986) identified three criteria for determining mediation. First, 
the independent variable must be significantly associated with the dependent variable. 
Second, the independent variable must be significantly associated with the mediating 
variable. Third, the mediator must be associated with the outcome variable in analyses 
that include both the independent variable and the mediator. Mediational analyses were 
conducted only when the first two criteria could be established. 
Contrary to expectations, no association was found between optimism and 
problem gambling (β = -.04, p = ns). Since this violated the first criterion, there was no 
effect to mediate or moderate. Thus, no additional analyses were conducted with the first 
model. 
The second model examined the moderating effect of expectancy flexibility on 
the relationship between optimism and preventive health behaviours, mediated by 
invulnerability. Research on unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1987), which I believe to 
be closely related to expectancy inflexibility, suggests that feelings of invulnerability may 
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be associated with low levels of expectancy flexibility. This, in turn, would weaken the 
association between optimism and preventive health behaviours. It was hypothesized that 
expectancy flexibility would moderate the positive relationship between optimism and 
preventive health behaviours such that it would reduce the effect of optimism on 
preventive health behaviours (i.e. lower levels of flexibility would reduce the relationship 
between optimism and preventive health behaviours). In addition, this moderating effect 
would be mediated by danger invulnerability. That is, it is predicted that individuals 
scoring low on expectancy flexibility would score higher on danger invulnerability, 
which in turn would moderate the association between optimism and preventive health 
behaviours.   
Mediated moderation was tested in three steps (Muller et al., 2005). First, the 
predictor, moderator, and their interaction term are regressed on the dependent variable 
(this is the same as a test of moderation). Second, the predictor, moderator, and their 
interaction term are regressed on the mediator variable. Third, the predictor, moderator, 
mediator, interaction of the predictor and moderator, and the interaction of the mediator 
and moderator are all regressed on the dependent variable. If there is a significant 
interaction (predictor x moderator) in the first step, and this interaction becomes non-
significant in third step, then moderation is mediated. Thus, at minimum, this interaction 
term must be significant before additional analyses can be conducted. 
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Table 15 
Regression (beta) weights for moderation analysis 
DV Optimism Expectancy 
flexibility 
Optimism x 
Expectancy 
flexibility 
MHBI-Diet .10 .11 .12 
MHBI-Substance Use .23** .17** .04 
MHBI-
Safety/Environment 
.07 .05 .02 
MHBI-Checkup .08 .07 .05 
MHBI-Social .20** .18** -.09 
MHBI-Stress/Rest .47** .15* -.04 
MHBI-Exercise .08 .07 .02 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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As shown in Table 15 above, although both optimism and expectancy flexibility 
were significantly associated with three of the MHBI subscales (Substance use, Social, 
and Stress/Rest), all of the interaction terms were non-significant. Because of this, no 
additional analyses were conducted. 
The third model investigated the mediating effect of academic approach coping 
on the association between optimism and academic success. This model initially tested 
whether academic approach coping would mediate the relation between optimism and 
academic success. It was hypothesized that expectancy flexibility would moderate the 
indirect effect of optimism on academic success through academic approach coping. That 
is, it was predicted that people scoring high on expectancy flexibility would exhibit a 
weaker relationship between optimism and academic approach coping. 
Ten separate models were examined, one for each of the academic success 
subscales (which were used as dependent variables). In each of the models, optimism 
served as the predictor variable, academic approach coping served as the mediator, and 
expectancy flexibility served as the moderator. The same criteria described above were 
used for determining the existence of mediation. The Sobel test was used to determine 
whether the decrease in β resulting from mediation was statistically significant. To 
reiterate, the independent variable must be significantly associated with the dependent 
variable, the independent variable must be significantly associated with the mediating 
variable, and the mediator must be associated with the outcome variable in analyses that 
include both the independent variable and the mediator. Mediational analyses were 
conducted only when the first two criteria could be established. 
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As shown in Table 13, no association was found between optimism and the skills 
(r = .11, p = ns), instructor efficacy (r = -.07, p = ns), career decidedness (r = .11, p = ns), 
external (r = -.08, p = ns), and internal (r = -.02, p = ns) subscales. This violated the first 
criteria of mediation; as a result, no mediational analyses were conducted using these 
dependent variables. However, there was a significant association between optimism and 
confidence (r = .25, p < .01), personal adjustment (r = .28, p < .01), self-regulation (r = 
.15, p < .05), socialization (r = .13, p < .05), and lack of anxiety (r = .15, p < .05). These 
subscales were entered into the mediational analyses as dependent variables. Since 
optimism was significantly associated with the academic approach coping (r = .31, p < 
.01), the second criterion could be established. 
Full mediational effects were found for academic approach coping on the 
association between optimism and self-regulation and between optimism and 
socialization. With the inclusion of academic approach coping in the model, optimism 
had no significant direct effect on self-regulation (β = .07, p = ns). This association was 
lower in magnitude than the significant direct effect of optimism without academic 
approach coping (β = .15, p < .05). Results of the Sobel test indicated that this 
mediational effect was significant (Sobel’s z = 3.23, p = .001). 
For socialization, with the inclusion of academic approach coping in the model, 
optimism had no significant direct effect on self-regulation (β = .07, p = ns). This 
association was smaller in magnitude than the significant direct effect of optimism 
without academic approach coping (β = .13, p < .05). Results of the Sobel test indicated 
that this mediational effect was significant (Sobel’s z = 2.61, p = .04). 
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A partial mediation effect was found for academic approach coping on the 
association between optimism and confidence. Although optimism was still significantly 
associated with confidence (β = .15, p < .05), the magnitude of this association was 
considerably smaller than the direct effect of optimism without academic approach 
coping (β = .25, p < .01). Results of the Sobel test indicated that this mediational effect 
was significant (Sobel’s z = 3.81, p < .001). Thus, academic approach coping partially 
mediated optimism’s association with confidence. 
However, academic approach coping did not mediate the effect of optimism on 
personal adjustment and lack of anxiety. The effect of optimism on personal adjustment 
with academic approach coping included (β = .27, p < .05) was only slightly lower than 
the direct effect of optimism without academic approach coping (β = .28, p < .01), and 
the Sobel test was non-significant (Sobel’s z = .70, p = ns). For the lack of anxiety 
variable, not only was there no mediational effect, there was evidence for a suppressor 
effect (Conger, 1974). With the inclusion of academic approach coping in the model, 
optimism had a significant direct effect on lack of anxiety (β = .21, p < .01), but this was 
unexpectedly greater in magnitude than the direct effect without academic approach 
coping (β = .15, p < .05). Results of the Sobel test indicated that this mediational effect 
was significant (Sobel’s z = -2.60, p = .01). 
Moderated mediation. In the next series of analyses, I tested the moderated 
mediation hypotheses. The first step was to conduct a simple moderation analysis. 
Expectancy flexibility was predicted to moderate the effect of optimism on academic 
success. Models previously shown to exhibit a mediation effect were examined to 
determine whether these mediational effects were moderated by expectancy flexibility. 
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Evidence for moderation would be given by a significant interaction effect. If moderation 
was supported, a second moderation analysis would be conducted wherein expectancy 
flexibility would moderate the effect of optimism on academic success, with academic 
approach coping treated as a covariate. Lastly, a final analysis combining moderation and 
mediation was conducted that included all four variables (i.e., optimism, academic 
success, academic approach coping, and expectancy flexibility). 
In the first set of analyses, optimism, expectancy flexibility, and their interaction 
were entered into a regression as independent variables. Confidence, self-regulation, and 
socialization were treated as dependent variables in three separate regressions. Table 16 
shows the results of these analyses.  
Confidence was predicted by optimism (β = 0.27, p < .01), expectancy flexibility 
(β = 0.25, p < .01), but not the optimism x expectancy flexibility interaction (β = -0.08, p 
= ns). Self-regulation was predicted by optimism (β = 0.14, p < .05), but not expectancy 
flexibility (β = -0.02, p = ns) or the optimism x expectancy flexibility interaction (β = -
0.11, p = ns). Socialization was predicted by optimism (β = 0.13, p < 0.05), but not 
expectancy flexibility (β = -0.02, p = ns) or the optimism x expectancy flexibility 
interaction (β = -0.01, p = ns). The lack of a significant interaction effect in all three 
analyses suggested that moderated mediation was not present; therefore, no additional 
analyses were conducted. 
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Table 16 
Regression beta-weights for moderated mediation analyses 
 Optimism Expectancy 
flexibility 
Optimism x 
Expectancy 
flexibility 
Confidence .27** .25** -.08 
Self-regulation .14* -.02 -.11 
Socialization .13* -.02 -.01 
**p < .01, *p < .05 
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Analysis of Qualitative Items. The qualitative items were analyzed to determine 
whether meaningful differences could be found between different types of participants. 
Participants were divided into four groups: flexible optimists (those scoring above the 
median on both the LOT-R and EFS), flexible pessimists (those scoring below the 
median on the LOT-R, but above the median on the EFS), inflexible optimists (those 
scoring above the median on the LOT-R, but below the median on the EFS), and 
inflexible pessimists (those scoring below the median on both the LOT-R and EFS). 
Scores of 52 or greater for the EFS were coded as “flexible” and scores 19 and over for 
the LOT-R were coded as “optimistic”.  Scores of 51 or lower on the EFS and 18 or 
lower on the LOT-R were coded as “inflexible” and “pessimistic”, respectively. This 
method yielded four groups of approximately equal size: 73 flexible optimists, 61 flexible 
pessimists, 66 inflexible optimists, and 50 inflexible pessimists.  Twenty-one percent of 
flexible optimists were male (n = 15), 21% of flexible pessimists were male (n = 13), 
21% of inflexible optimists were male (n = 14), and 32% of inflexible pessimists were 
male (n = 16). The remaining participants in each group were female. The proportion of 
males in each group did not significantly differ (χ2 = 2.73, p = ns). 
 Participant responses were read and coded by the author and were organized into 
various themes (often, more than one theme was identified in a participant’s responses). 
Participant responses were discarded if they were too brief (e.g., a simple yes/no) or were 
not relevant (e.g. did not answer the question with a cogent response).   
The order of the questions started off general and became more specific, so as to 
avoid “priming”. For each question, two to five themes were identified. The proportion 
and frequency of each theme is given below, for each of the four groups identified above 
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(i.e., flexible optimists, flexible pessimists, inflexible optimists, and inflexible pessimists. 
Percentages may not add to 100% because some participants expressed multiple themes, 
or their responses could not be easily categorized. These results are summarized in Tables 
17-23. 
Question 1: “When something bad happens that you don't expect, does this 
influence your expectations of the future?  If so, how?” 
Two-hundred and forty participants responded to this item. An additional 19 
responses were discarded because they were too brief or were not relevant. This left 221 
responses, which was composed of 67 flexible optimists, 54 flexible pessimists, 58 
inflexible optimists, and 42 inflexible pessimists. Several themes emerged from the 
responses to this item. In general, the responses to this item were mostly in the 
affirmative, suggesting that most participants became more pessimistic in these 
situations. Four common themes were identified: contingent shift, hopelessness/doubt, 
approach coping, and positive thinking. These results are shown in Table 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A Glass Half Full    109 
 
Table 17 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 1 
 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Contingent shift 25 (37%) 17 (32%) 7 (12%) 8 (19%) 
Hopelessness/doubt 12 (18%) 15 (28%) 8 (14%) 17 (41%) 
Approach coping 19 (28%) 14 (26%) 9 (16%) 4 (9%) 
Positive thinking 11 (16%) 4 (7%) 22 (38%) 4 (9%) 
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Most participants (regardless of their level of optimism or expectancy flexibility) 
indicated that such an event would shift their expectations toward pessimism. However, 
most participants stated that this shift toward pessimism was temporary. A subgroup of 
participants indicated that they would become more pessimistic, but only in the face of a 
severely negative event. As one participant put it, “It depends on the situation, but yes, 
sometimes if something bad and unexpected happens it will cause anxiety and distress in 
me.” This “contingent shift” in expectations was quite common among flexible optimists 
(37%) and flexible pessimists alike (32%), and less common among inflexible pessimists 
(19%) and inflexible optimists (12%). Another subset of participants expressed a loss of 
confidence, hopelessness, and self-doubt in the face of negative events. This was dubbed 
the “hopelessness/doubt” theme. For example, one participant said that such negative 
events “often can lead to bringing up other feelings and I can get depressed very easily.” 
Unsurprisingly, many inflexible pessimists expressed this theme (41%), though flexible 
pessimists (28%) also commonly expressed this kind of thinking. These participants 
typically made what Seligman et al. have called “pessimistic attributions” (stable and 
global negative beliefs about the future). Both inflexible (14%) and flexible optimists 
(18%) expressed this theme, but were less likely to do so than both groups of pessimists. 
Other participants expressed what could be called “positive thinking.” These 
participants expressed that negative events would not change their expectations. This was 
common among inflexible optimists (38%) and less common among the other groups: 
16% of flexible optimists, 9% of inflexible pessimists, and 7% of flexible pessimists. 
These participants expressed an unflappable optimism even in the face of adversity (as 
one participant put it, “My hope will never drop”). But not all such participants were 
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cockeyed optimists. In some cases, their responses included coping styles like positive 
reframing, wherein individuals try to see negative situations in a more positive light. 
Some participants indicated that negative events would cause them to reappraise 
the situation or be better prepared for the future. This “approach” style was often 
accompanied by a shift in expectations. That is, a shift toward pessimism often motivated 
participants into action. Often participants saw it as an opportunity for self-improvement 
or said that they would deal with it by talking it over with someone or that they would 
find another way to reach their goals, e.g. “When something bad happens, I question 
myself as to why it had to happen... I try to prevent the same thing to happen [sic] in the 
future.” This theme was most common among flexible optimists (28%) and flexible 
pessimists (26%) and less common among the other groups: 16% of inflexible optimists, 
and 9% of inflexible pessimists. 
Question 2: “If you get a bad grade, do your expectations for your grade on the 
next test change?  If so, how?” 
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 240, 96%). Here, the responses 
were more mixed. An additional 17 responses were discarded because they were either 
too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not relevant. This left 223 responses, which was 
composed of 67 flexible optimists, 54 flexible pessimists, 56 inflexible optimists, and 46 
inflexible pessimists. Three primary themes were identified: “discouragement”, “lowered 
expectations” and “motivation” (many participants also believed that a poor exam grade 
would not change their expectations for the future, but there was little difference between 
optimists and pessimists and between inflexible and flexible participants). These results 
were summarized in Table 18. 
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Table 18 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 2 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Discouragement 12 (18%) 10 (19%) 7 (13%) 21 (45%) 
Lowered expectations 4 (6%) 17 (31%) 1 (2%) 13 (28%) 
Motivation 43 (64%) 28 (51%) 27 (48%) 14 (31%) 
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Participants expressing discouragement believed that getting a bad exam grade 
was a sign of failure or inability to succeed in their coursework. They generally did not 
indicate that they would change their behavior for the next exam. As one participant put 
it, “If I get a bad grade on a test, then I have the expectation that I will do poorly again.” 
This was common among inflexible pessimists (45%), but uncommon among flexible 
pessimists (19%), flexible optimists (18%) and inflexible optimists (13%).  
Some participants indicated that they would intentionally lower their expectations 
about their next grade. For example, on participant stated, “I usually tend to lower my 
expectations for the next test…then there is less room for disappointment if another bad 
grade is received.” This theme was sometimes accompanied by a belief that they would 
take action to do better on the next exam. Lowered expectations were common among 
both flexible pessimists (31%) and inflexible pessimists (28%), but less common among 
flexible optimists (6%) and rare among inflexible optimists (2%).  
Many participants indicated that getting a bad grade would motivate them to work 
harder on the next exam. These participants indicated that they were determined to do 
better to raise their average by making “adjustments” to their study strategy. For 
example, one participant stated, “Yes, I start to work a lot harder so I can obtain the grade 
I want.” This was common among flexible optimists (64%) and flexible pessimists 
(51%), with smaller percentages among inflexible optimists (48%) and inflexible 
pessimists (31%). However, flexible optimists and flexible pessimists were differentiated 
primarily in what motivated them. Flexible pessimists said that the fear of getting another 
bad grade motivated them into action, while flexible optimists said that the hope of 
getting a good grade provided them with motivation.  
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Question 3: “How does getting a bad grade change your behaviour for the next 
exam?” 
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 238, 95%). An additional 12 
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not 
relevant. This left 226 responses, which was composed of 68 flexible optimists, 55 
flexible pessimists, 58 inflexible optimists, and 45 inflexible pessimists. Due to the 
similarity to the previous question, similar themes appeared. Predictably, almost all 
(82%) of the participants indicated that getting a bad grade would motivate them to study 
more. Three themes appeared, specifically: “anxiety-as-motivation”, “motivation without 
anxiety” and “feelings of failure”. These results were summarized in Table 19. 
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Table 19 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 3 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Anxiety-as-motivation 14 (21%) 29 (53%) 5 (8%) 5 (12%) 
Feelings of failure 1 (2%) 4 (8%) 9 (15%) 13 (28%) 
Motivation 47 (69%) 24 (44%) 38 (65%) 25 (56%) 
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This anxiety-as-motivation theme was particularly common amongst flexible 
pessimists (53% of flexible pessimists expressed this theme, compared to 21% of flexible 
optimists, 12% of inflexible pessimists, and 8% of inflexible optimists). Both flexible 
optimists and inflexible optimists were motivated to study harder, with little anxiety. 
Feelings of failure were endorsed by relatively few participants (9% overall). 
These feelings were largely confined to inflexible pessimists (28%); however, it was also 
a common theme amongst inflexible optimists (15%). Many of these participants did not 
express a motivation to study harder (suggesting helplessness). Flexible pessimists (8%) 
and flexible optimists (2%) were unlikely to express these themes. 
The last theme was called “motivation without anxiety”. This theme was similar 
to the anxiety-as-motivation theme, except the motivation that participants felt was 
accompanied by relatively little anxiety. For example, one participant responded, 
“No…One bad grade motivates me to try harder to achieve my expected grade on the 
next test.” This theme was quite common amongst all four groups (69% of flexible 
optimists expressed this theme, compared to 65% of inflexible optimists, 56% of 
inflexible pessimists, and 44% of flexible pessimists). 
Question 4: “When the outcome an upcoming future event is uncertain, how 
optimistic or pessimistic are you about what will happen?” 
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 234, 94%), but 15 responses 
were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not relevant. This 
left 219 responses (66 flexible optimists, 53 flexible pessimists, 56 inflexible optimists, 
and 44 inflexible pessimists). Four themes emerged: “optimistic”, “defensive 
pessimistic”, “mixed”, and “pessimistic”. These results were summarized in Table 20. 
 A Glass Half Full    117 
 
Table 20 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 4 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Optimistic  26 (39%) 18 (34%) 43 (76%) 7 (15%) 
Defensive pessimistic 12 (18%) 22 (41%) 4 (8%) 7 (15%) 
Mixed 14 (21%) 15 (28%) 5 (9%) 2 (5%) 
Pessimistic 0 (0%) 10 (22%) 3 (6%) 32 (72%) 
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The optimistic theme was characterized by positive expectations about the future. 
These participants said that their optimism helped them cope with uncertain outcomes. It 
was most common among inflexible optimists (76%), with smaller numbers among 
flexible optimists (39%), flexible pessimists (34%), and inflexible pessimists (15%). This 
theme was occasionally accompanied by magical thinking, e.g., “I believe…that 
something good will happen if I think positive.” 
The defensive-pessimistic theme was characterized by a deliberately setting 
expectations low so as not to be disappointed, e.g., “I usually try to set my expectations 
low because it's always nice to be pleasantly surprised.” One common statement that 
emerged for the defensive pessimistic theme was a sentiment of “hope for the best, 
prepare for the worst” (one participant stated this verbatim). It was most common among 
flexible pessimists (41%), with smaller numbers among flexible optimists (18%), 
inflexible pessimists (15%), and inflexible optimists (8%). 
The “mixed” theme was characterized by a mix of pessimistic and optimistic 
beliefs. It was common among flexible pessimists (28%) and flexible optimists (21%), 
and rarer among inflexible optimists (9%) and inflexible pessimists (5%). Participants 
endorsing this theme often emphasized their neutrality or equanimity in the face of such 
an event. Participants often qualified their response by saying that their optimism or 
pessimism would depend on their familiarity or confidence with the event, e.g., “If I feel 
fairly confident in the event, I would be optimistic... If it is an event I'm not familiar with, 
than I usually am pessimistic.”  
The pessimistic theme was most common among inflexible pessimists (72%), 
with smaller amounts among flexible pessimists (22%), inflexible optimists (6%), and no 
 A Glass Half Full    119 
 
occurrences among flexible optimists. This theme was characterized by negative 
expectations about the future, but unlike the defensive pessimistic theme, participants did 
not express this a strategic lowering of expectations to prevent possible disappointment, 
e.g., “I am highly pessimistic about the future event being negative.” 
Question 5: “When something happens that far exceeds your expectations, how 
does this affect your expectations of the future?” 
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 235, 95%). An additional 21 
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not 
relevant. This left 214 responses, which was composed of 65 flexible optimists, 52 
flexible pessimists, 56 inflexible optimists, and 41 inflexible pessimists. Several themes 
emerged for this question, including: “shift toward optimism”, “defensive pessimism” 
and “no change in expectations”. These results were summarized in Table 21. 
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Table 21 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 5 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Shift toward optimism 33 (51%) 17 (32%) 27 (48%) 10 (25%) 
Defensive pessimism 5 (8%) 10 (19%) 1 (2%) 11 (28%) 
No change in expectations 16 (25%) 11 (20%) 13 (23%) 12 (29%) 
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Many participants expressed a shift toward optimism as a consequence of a very 
positive event. In many cases, these participants thought that it would lead to other good 
things (e.g., “It makes me feel more excited for the future, like more good things will 
keep happening”). This theme was most common among flexible optimists (51%) and 
inflexible optimists (48%); though it was also quite common among flexible pessimists 
(32%) and inflexible pessimists (25%). 
Some participants reported that such a rare event would have no effect on their 
expectations. These participants stated that although such a positive outcome improved 
their mood and gave them a “big confidence boost”, it would not make them more 
optimistic. A few (mostly inflexible pessimists) shrugged it off, attributing such good 
fortune to luck or other people, e.g., “must of [sic] been luck... or something someone did 
to help.” This theme was widely endorsed; 29% of inflexible pessimists, 25% of flexible 
optimists, 23% of inflexible optimists, and 20% of flexible pessimists expressed this 
theme.  
Other participants indicated that they did not raise their expectations to prevent 
getting their hopes up too much. As expressed by one participant, “In the past, high 
grades or outstanding feedback has made me so confident that I could even get cocky…I 
would study less for the second midterm if I did really well on the first midterm because I 
didn’t think I needed to study as much. I got too confident and then had to pay for it later 
when I had a bad mark on my second midterm from not studying as much”). This theme 
was most common among inflexible pessimists (28%), and flexible pessimists (19%), and 
less common among flexible optimists (8%) and inflexible optimists (2%). 
 A Glass Half Full    122 
 
Question 6: “When you feel in control of the outcome, how does this affect your 
expectations of the future?” 
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 238, 96%). An additional 28 
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not 
relevant. This left 210 responses, which was composed of 65 flexible optimists, 51 
flexible pessimists, 53 inflexible optimists, and 41 inflexible pessimists. Several themes 
emerged: An “optimistic” theme and a “pessimistic” theme. These results were 
summarized in Table 22. 
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Table 22 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 6 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Optimistic 65 (100%) 45 (88%) 50 (95%) 33 (81%) 
Pessimistic 0 (0%) 6 (12%) 3 (5%) 8 (19%) 
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Participants who expressed optimism said that a sense of control made them feel 
more confident in a positive outcome. As one participant put it, “I feel more confident 
and get more done.” As one would expect, the optimistic theme was almost universal 
among inflexible optimists (95%) and flexible optimists (100%), but was also expressed 
by most flexible pessimists (88%) and inflexible pessimists (81%).  
Participants who expressed pessimism were unaffected by having a sense of 
control (e.g. “I usually feel like things could still go wrong”). This theme was much rarer 
than the optimistic theme, even among inflexible pessimists (19%) and flexible 
pessimists (12%). None of the flexible optimists and only 5% of inflexible optimists 
expressed this pessimistic theme. 
Question 7: “When something unusually good or unusually bad happens, how 
does this affect your expectations of the future?” 
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 237, 95%). An additional 26 
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not 
relevant. This left 211 responses, which was composed of 65 flexible optimists, 52 
flexible pessimists, 54 inflexible optimists, and 40 inflexible pessimists. In general, the 
responses to this question were similar to those of Question 5. However, the three major 
themes that emerged were subtly different: “shift to optimism (but not pessimism)”, “no 
change”, and “pessimistic”. These results were summarized in Table 23. 
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Table 23 
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 7 
Themes Flexible 
optimists 
Flexible 
pessimists 
Inflexible 
optimists 
Inflexible 
pessimists 
Shift to optimism 18 (28%) 13 (25%) 21 (39%) 4 (11%) 
No change 38 (58%) 13 (25%) 22 (41%) 7 (18%) 
Pessimistic 10 (15%) 19 (37%) 5 (9%) 25 (62%) 
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Some participants said that regardless of how good or bad the event, their 
expectations would remain unchanged. This theme was endorsed by 58% of flexible 
optimists (as one flexible optimist put it, “It doesn't usually affect my expectation for the 
future”). Forty-one percent of inflexible optimists, 25% of flexible pessimists and 18% of 
inflexible pessimists also expressed this theme in their responses. 
Other participants said that a positive, but not a negative event, would change 
their expectations, e.g., “If it is something unusually good my expectations tend to 
increase for the future; however if it is something bad they may decrease but not to same 
scale.” This theme was most common among inflexible optimists (39%) and flexible 
optimists (28%). However, about one quarter flexible pessimists also expressed this 
theme (though only 11% of inflexible pessimists expressed this theme). 
A third group of participants expressed a pessimistic attitude even in the face of 
positive events, e.g. “I expect that good things won't last for long and when very bad 
things happen I feel hopeless and like I cannot reach my expectations anymore.”  This 
theme was especially prevalent among inflexible pessimists (62%), though 37% of 
flexible pessimists also expressed this theme. Fifteen percent of flexible optimists and 
nine percent of inflexible optimists expressed pessimism. 
Brief Discussion 
The above findings demonstrate that both expectancy flexibility and optimism 
were related to many indices of psychological and physical well-being. These 
associations between expectancy flexibility and various measures were independent from 
those of optimism. The findings reported in the previous section are interpreted below. 
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Expectancy flexibility was positively associated with academic approach coping. 
This finding is consistent with the idea of flexibility promoting preparedness. People who 
scored high on expectancy flexibility may be more apt to change their behaviour to 
achieve their desired future (or avoid a negative alternative future). By engaging in 
approach coping, it is plausible that students may be better prepared for exams and 
graded assignments.  
In terms of health outcomes, expectancy flexibility was negatively related to 
substance use and positively related to social health. These findings suggested that 
individuals who are more flexible may consider the negative consequences that excessive 
engagement in substance use might have. Meanwhile, individuals scoring high on 
expectancy flexibility were more likely to engage in positive social activities.  
Expectancy flexibility was also related to less problem gambling. This suggested 
that, consistent with predictions, having flexible expectations allows people to disengage 
when persistence is a bad strategy. Expectancy flexibility was also associated with 
several subscales on the ASICS. The positive association with General Academic Skills 
suggests that individuals scoring high on flexibility are more likely to have better study 
skills; this is not unusual, given that flexibility is thought to motivate people into taking 
anticipatory action. This was consistent with the association between expectancy 
flexibility and confidence. Perhaps their confidence comes from the ability of flexible 
people to be prepared, and this sense of preparedness gives them a sense of self-
assurance, despite higher levels of anxiety (the negative association between expectancy 
flexibility and the lack of anxiety subscale means higher scores on expectancy flexibility 
were associated with higher levels of anxiety). Given expectancy flexibility’s association 
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with defensive pessimism, this association was not surprising. Although anxiety is an 
unpleasant emotion and is considered a clinical disorder in its extreme, anxiety need not 
be unhealthy and at mild levels could motivate students to engage in proactive behaviour 
(Raffety, Smith, & Ptacek, 1997). Lastly, the positive association with External 
Motivation suggested that individuals scoring high in expectancy flexibility are motivated 
by extrinsic rewards (i.e. grades).  
Unlike expectancy flexibility, there is already an extensive literature base on 
optimism. Thus, the findings for optimism can be compared and contrasted with past 
findings. These correlations between optimism and the other study measures were largely 
consistent with those of previous studies, though there were a few new findings. These 
comparisons are described in the section below. 
Optimism was positively correlated with several ASICS subscales, including 
Confidence, Personal adjustment, Self-regulation, Socializing, and Lack of Anxiety 
subscales. This was consistent with previous research that has shown that optimists have 
greater confidence (Grove & Heard, 1997), better personal adjustment (Chemers, Hu, & 
Garcia, 2001), better self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 2001), and have less anxiety 
(Scheier et al., 1994). The finding that optimists were less likely to engage in negative 
socializing was unexpected, and suggests that some pessimists may engage in partying as 
a form of self-handicapping (Graham & Williams, 2009). However, null findings for the 
other five subscales (i.e. Career Decidedness, Skills, Instructor Efficacy, Internal, and 
External) contradicted previous findings suggesting that optimism was related to career 
decision-making self-efficacy and both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation 
(Creed, Patton, & Bartrum, 2002; Hoekman, McCormick, & Barnett, 2005). The lack of 
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association between optimism and perceived instructor efficacy was unsurprising, 
considering that optimism has little conceptual relationship to the perceived efficacy and 
competence of others.  
Optimism’s positive association with cognitive flexibility and approach coping 
and negative association with avoidance coping suggests that the optimists engaged in 
healthier coping styles than did pessimists. This was consistent with previous findings for 
optimism and coping (Carver et al., 1989; Scheier et al., 1986). 
Optimism’s positive association with the substance use subscale of the MHBI 
(because this scale is reverse-scored this means that more optimism was associated with 
less substance use) suggested that optimism may have a buffering effect against 
substance use, consistent with the findings of other studies (Carvajal, Clair, Nash, & 
Evans, 1998). This finding, however, contradicted studies suggesting that unrealistic 
optimism may be related to negative experiences related to alcohol (Dillard, Midboe, & 
Klein, 2009). Optimism was also positively associated with the Social and Stress 
subscales of the MHBI, indicating that optimists had better social health and lower stress 
than pessimists. This was consistent with previous literature suggesting that optimists are 
more likely to seek social support and have less stress than pessimists (Brissette, Scheier, 
& Carver, 2002). 
Because no association between optimism and problem gambling was found, 
there was a lack of support for the first model. This contradicts previous findings, 
suggesting that optimism would be associated with problematic gambling behaviours 
(Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). However, because Gibson and Sanbonmatsu did not 
employ a comprehensive measure of problem gambling in their study, it was uncertain 
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whether the findings of the present study contradict their findings. Because of the lack of 
association, no further analyses were conducted. 
The lack of support for a moderating effect for the second model was unexpected. 
The lack of an interaction contradicts the results of prior studies suggesting an association 
between invulnerability and health/risk behaviours and between health/risk behaviours 
and optimism (Lapsley & Hill, 2010; Ravert et al., 2009; Ravert & Zimet, 2009). 
However, no known studies have used this moderational model before. It is possible that 
invulnerability does not moderate the relationship between optimism and health 
behaviours.  
There was limited support for the third model. Full mediational effects were 
found for academic approach coping on the association between optimism and both self-
regulation and socialization, and a partial mediation effect for academic approach coping 
on the association between optimism and confidence. This was consistent with previous 
findings suggesting that optimism’s effects on academic success can be explained by 
academic approach coping (Chemers et al., 2001). It is plausible that optimists were more 
apt to engage in approach coping in academic situations. This in turn may increase self-
regulation and boost confidence, while reducing activities that may potentially inhibit 
academic performance, like excessive partying. 
Qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions generally supported the 
hypothesis that expectancy flexibility was associated with shifts in expectations. 
However, shifts were not always seen, particularly for events perceived as uniquely 
positive or negative. Flexible optimists were the most likely to modify their expectations 
in the face of negative feedback. This observed shift in expectations may have been an 
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effort to reduce disappointment (van Dijk et al., 2003). Flexible pessimists showed a 
similar pattern of expectation shifts. Lastly, both inflexible optimists and pessimists 
tended to maintain their expectations regardless of the context. That is, inflexible 
optimists remained positive in light of negative events and inflexible pessimists remained 
negative in light of positive events. 
General Discussion 
 
The findings of these studies generally supported the validity of the EFS scale and 
associated hypotheses. Yet, one should exercise cautious optimism about this new 
measure, because some of the hypotheses were not supported. Consistent with previous 
research on defensive pessimism, lowering one’s expectations may have value as a 
strategic form of coping, and ought not to be perceived as merely being a symptom of 
hopelessness. Furthermore, these findings lend support to the existence of the construct 
that Seligman calls “flexible optimism.” The findings of Study 3 suggest that people do 
shift their expectations under some circumstances. Consistent with hypotheses, these 
shifts appear to be related to receiving negative feedback. Bracing for potentially 
negative situations may help people to be better prepared for them when they occur. 
Maintaining unrealistic optimism in such situations may do more harm than good. 
The first aim of this study, which was to extend past research to investigate 
whether there are some contexts in which optimism is disadvantageous, found no support 
for the purported negative effects of optimism. Instead, the associations between 
optimism and positive outcomes (including the lack of negative outcomes) were either 
positive or non-significant. This suggests one of two things: either the negative effects of 
optimism are limited or the sample used was not sensitive to finding such negative 
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effects. In the latter case, perhaps negative effects of optimism would have been evident 
in a sample of problem gamblers or alcoholics. 
The second aim was to determine whether expectancy flexibility adds incremental 
validity to the prediction of outcomes above and beyond that of optimism. Expectancy 
flexibility was associated with several positive outcomes, including greater academic 
approach coping, social health, general academic skills, and academic confidence, and 
less substance use and problem gambling. Notably, optimism was not associated with 
general academic skills or with problem gambling. Thus, it is fair to say that expectancy 
flexibility had incremental validity. 
Three models were tested in Study 4. Unfortunately, for the most part, the results 
did not support the hypotheses. There was no support for the first model because no 
association between optimism and problem gambling was found. There was also no 
support for a moderational effect of expectancy flexibility on the association between 
optimism and health behaviours. There was, however, limited support for the hypothesis 
that academic approach coping would mediate the association between optimism and 
several aspects of academic success, including self-regulation, socialization, and 
confidence.  
This study had several limitations which limit the interpretability of the findings. 
First, studies 1, 2, and 4 used a cross-sectional, correlational design. This means that (like 
previous studies) causality cannot be inferred. It is possible that optimism is the outcome 
of good health or positive coping, to name a few examples. Another possibility is that a 
third variable explains these relationships.  
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Another limitation involves sampling. This study employed a general sample of 
university students, who were disproportionately young and female. This is particularly 
relevant for the gambling measures. Most individuals in the sample had little experience 
with gambling. A sample of people who have more gambling experience (not necessarily 
problem gamblers) may have been a better choice for testing the hypothesis that 
expectancy flexibility would be inversely related with problem gambling. 
 Another set of limitations concerned the EFS scale itself. Its internal consistency 
reliability, while in the acceptable range, was relatively low (ideally, Cronbach’s α should 
be greater than .80). The low reliability may have attenuated some of the correlations. 
Additionally, no data were collected on the test-retest reliability of the EFS, which could 
have been used to demonstrate the temporal stability of the construct. That being said, the 
EFS demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity. More refinement of the 
EFS may be necessary to better capture the nature of the expectancy flexibility construct. 
Despite these limitations, the findings of the present study have important 
implications for future research. Of particular interest would be an examination the 
effects of flexible optimism in a population of individuals diagnosed as having a 
gambling addiction. Some of the hypotheses regarding gambling were not supported in 
this sample; this could be attributed to the low base rate of problem gambling in the 
general population of university students (Gainsbury, Russell, & Blaszczynski, 2014; 
Lesieur et al., 1991).  Similarly, the effects of expectancy flexibility on health would be 
better tested using a large population of middle-aged and older adults studied over a 
period of several years. With sufficient time and funding, such a study could be 
undertaken, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Another interesting line of inquiry would be to test whether there are cross-
cultural differences in expectancy flexibility. Research from the United States suggests 
that Caucasian Americans are generally more optimistic than other racial and ethnic 
groups. For example, Chang (1996) found that Asian Americans were more pessimistic, 
but not less optimistic, than Caucasian Americans, and no difference in measures of 
positive and negative affect was found between the two groups. This somewhat 
contradictory finding could be explained by expectancy flexibility; perhaps people of 
Asian ancestry are more pessimistic, but also more flexible, than Caucasians living in 
North America. Similarly, researchers ought to examine whether expectancy flexibility 
has differing effects based on age. This was not possible in the present study due to the 
restricted age range associated with university student samples; however, research 
suggests that associations between optimism and affect differ by age (Palgi, Shrira, Ben-
Ezra, Cohen-Fridel, & Bodner, 2011). It is possible that similar patterns exist for 
expectancy flexibility. 
The findings of the present study also have applied value for interventions. 
Current optimism-promoting interventions are potentially flawed. The most common 
optimism-boosting intervention is the “best possible self” intervention, which typically 
involves instructing individuals to imagine an ideal future and to think about goals that 
they would like to attain. There are two potential problems with this type of intervention. 
First, there is very little research to suggest that optimism-boosting interventions create 
long-term changes in optimism. Malouff and Schutte (2017) found that studies of 
optimism-promoting interventions that collected outcome data within a day of the end of 
the intervention had more than twice the effect size of studies that collected data more 
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than one day after the intervention commenced. It is plausible that changes in optimism 
as a result of these interventions are only short-term. Worse yet, if individuals fail to 
realize their best possible selves, do they fall back into despair? Second, it is possible that 
optimism interventions could make individuals maladaptively and inflexibly optimistic. 
Replacing pessimism with a superficial optimism may do more harm than good: 
individuals may become more prone to taking unnecessary risks in order to achieve their 
goals. Lastly, attempts to reduce unrealistic optimism have fared poorly. Interventions to 
reduce unrealistic optimism have been mostly unsuccessful in changing behaviour 
(Weinstein & Klein, 1995). It is reasonable to speculate that these interventions may 
make individuals defensive or they may simply lapse into bad habits.  
It may be more prudent to recommend cultivating flexible optimism, while 
emphasizing that lowering expectations may be preferable in some contexts. Potentially, 
researchers could develop interventions boosting expectancy flexibility alongside 
optimism. A particularly fruitful use of such interventions would be in circumstances 
where a constant optimism may not be beneficial. Judging by the findings of the present 
study, expectancy flexibility interventions could be particularly useful in increasing 
academic confidence and skills, and reducing problem gambling. Interventions that 
promote expectancy flexibility could be used to treat problem gambling by dampening 
some of the unrealistically optimistic expectations that some gamblers may have (Gibson 
& Sanbonmatsu, 2004).  
Expectancy flexibility interventions would likely take different forms depending 
on the age of the individuals targeted by the intervention. Interventions developed for 
young adult and adolescent populations might address drug and alcohol abuse, sexual 
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health (e.g. condom and birth control use), and academic skills. In older populations, 
interventions could be developed to reduce the risk of severe health conditions. Such 
interventions could promote taking preventive action against health threats, including 
eating well, getting sufficient exercise, quitting smoking, and obtaining regular health 
screening (e.g. mammograms, prostate exams, colonoscopies). People who are inflexibly 
optimistic might be prone to ignoring or discounting important health cues and warnings 
(Norem & Chang, 2001), while those who are inflexibly pessimistic might tend towards 
despair and apathy about their health. Promoting flexibility could reduce these disparate 
barriers to better health in both populations. Interventions could even be developed for 
young children as well, similar to what has been developed for optimism (Seligman, 
2007). For example, children could be shown how to temper their expectations in order to 
deal with potential disappointment and to remain optimistic in the face of negative 
outcomes. 
The findings of the present study may be of relevance to clinicians. Clients who 
manifest with depressive or anxious symptoms may be prone to extreme inflexible 
pessimism and may benefit from being more flexible in their expectations. It may be 
more effective to help these clients to become more flexible, rather than trying to replace 
their pessimism with optimism. Although no single diagnosis corresponds to extreme 
inflexible optimism (there is no such thing as clinical optimism, though perhaps there 
ought to be), I speculate that people diagnosed with addictive disorders or bipolar 
disorder may be at high risk. Inflexible optimism may also be in part a defensive reaction 
against extreme pessimism. For inflexibly optimistic clients, a dose of reality may be 
beneficial, as is often emphasized in cognitive-behavioural approaches. 
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Expectancy flexibility could also be applied to organizational contexts. Extending 
the findings of Hmieleski and Baron (2009), perhaps expectancy flexibility could 
dissuade businesses from making risky decisions. In social contexts, expectancy 
flexibility may promote “big optimism” (Peterson, 2000), the collective optimism of 
groups. Social movements, to an extent, depend on the optimism of group members. 
Extreme pessimism often leads to apathy, while extreme optimism may cause 
disappointment if the movement initially fails in its objectives. Expectancy flexibility 
may help social movements succeed by reducing apathy, but not raising expectations so 
high that they lead to disappointment in the face of failure. This raises the possibility that 
expectancy flexibility may be related to resilience or self-efficacy. 
In conclusion, the findings of the present study provide tentative support for the 
notion that expectancy flexibility can have beneficial effects. Individuals who can 
flexibly adjust their expectations may be better able to cope with challenging situations in 
ways that those who express blind optimism cannot. Pessimism may occasionally be 
beneficial, even if optimism feels better in the short-run. Occasionally, we must “have the 
courage to endure pessimism” (Seligman, 1991, p. 292). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Letter of Information 
 
 
 
LETTER OF INFORMATION FOR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
       
Title of Study: Student Health and Well-being Study 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Mr. Phillip Ianni and Dr. 
Kathryn Lafreniere, from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. The 
data collected from this study will contribute to Mr. Ianni’s dissertation. This research 
will be conducted under the supervision of Dr. Lafreniere. If you have any questions or 
concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the principal investigator, Phillip 
Ianni, Psychology Dept., University of Windsor. Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 2233, email: 
ianni1@uwindsor.ca or the faculty supervisor: Dr. Kathryn Lafreniere, Psychology Dept., 
University of Windsor. Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 2233, email: lafren1@uwindsor.ca        
                                      
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY                                                        
This study will examine the relationships between several personality measures and 
several indices of well-being (health, gambling behaviour, and academic success). 
 
PROCEDURES 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to: Go to the survey by 
clicking on the link at the end of this form. The survey will involve a number of different 
sections that ask about your personality tendencies, particularly your expectations about 
the future. You will also be asked to provide some background information about 
yourself. It is expected that it will take no more than 60 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire, including the time it takes to read this consent form and get started. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
This research involves minimal risk to you. However, if you feel uncomfortable 
answering some of the questions, you are free to skip them. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
Participating in this study will allow you to experience research in the area of personality, 
which may be useful for you if you will conduct research or read about research in this 
area in the future. Your participation is important, since findings from research studies 
such as this one contribute to scientific knowledge about the design of personality tests. 
 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
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Participants will receive 1 bonus point for up to 60 minutes of participation towards the 
Psychology Participant Pool, if registered in the pool and enrolled in one or more eligible 
courses. You will not receive payment for your participation. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified 
with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. Your 
questionnaire responses will be stored separately from your identifying information, and 
will be grouped with other people's responses so that your identifying information will 
never be linked with the data that you provide. All the information you provide will be 
stored on a secure, password-protected computer that will only be accessed by the 
researchers. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, 
you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may also refuse to 
answer any questions you don't want to answer and still be in the study. The investigator 
may withdraw you from this research if circumstances rise which warrant doing so. You 
can remove yourself at any time during the study before completion by discontinuing 
your participation and exiting your browser. However, if you discontinue your 
participation in the study by exiting your browser, you will not be eligible to receive 
credit for participation. You can choose to skip questions and complete the survey and 
still be eligible to receive credit for your participation. You can withdraw up to the point 
of submitting your survey data. You cannot withdraw after you have submitted your data. 
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS 
The findings for this research study will be analyzed by September 1, 2016. Once the 
results are analyzed, a summary of the findings of this study will be posted on the 
Research Ethics Board website. Web address: www.uwindsor.ca/reb/study-resultsDate 
when results are available: September 1, 2016 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research 
Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-
253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca 
 
Please click the button below "I agree to participate" in order to continue to the survey. 
I agree to participate 
I do not wish to participate 
 
PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS FORM AND KEEP IT FOR YOUR 
RECORDS (you can use your browser’s ‘Print’ option to print this page) 
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Appendix B 
Academic Coping Strategies Scale (ACSS) 
 
Think about a time when you received a low grade on an important exam, significantly 
lower than what you usually get. Indicate below how often you used each strategy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Almost never  Hardly ever Sometimes Often Almost always 
 
1.I tried to stay calm 
2. I talked to another student for emotional support 
3. I left the problem situation altogether 
4. I got other peoples’ perspective of the problem 
5. I talked to a friend from outside school, or a family member, for specific advice on 
how to solve the problem 
6. I tried to find out what I did wrong 
7. I avoided talking to anyone about the problem 
8. I used drugs or alcohol 
9. I tried to gain control over the problem 
10. I thought about hurting myself 
11. I talked to a professor/supervisor for specific advice on how to solve the problem 
12. I drew on my past experiences to help me solve the problem 
13. I engaged in physical activity or exercise 
14. I gave up 
15. I hid my feelings from others, keeping my feelings to myself 
16. I wished that I was more capable of dealing with the problem situation 
17. I told myself the problem isn’t that important 
18. I ignored the problem 
19. I expressed my emotions to someone 
20. I thought positively about the problem 
21. I brainstormed a variety of possible solutions to the problem 
22. I gathered additional information about the problem, finding out more about the 
problem 
23. I tried to learn something from the experience 
24. I withdrew from other people 
25. I put forth more effort into developing skills to master the problem 
26. I tried to learn from my mistakes 
27. I engaged in activities to distract myself from the problem (reading, watching a 
movie, watching TV, listening to music) 
28. I tell myself that everything will be all right 
29. I adjust my priorities 
30. I talked to a friend from outside school, or a family member, for emotional support 
31. I got advice from someone who has had the same problem 
32. I denied that the problem exists 
33. I expressed my emotions by crying 
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34. I kept a sense of humor about the problem 
35. I avoided people or things that reminded me of the problem 
36. I tried to think about the problem carefully before acting 
37. I spent time with someone I care about 
38. I did nothing about the problem 
39. I wished that the problem would go away on its own 
40. I was persistent in trying to solve or fix the problem 
41. I set specific goals for solving the problem 
42. I hoped that the problem would fix itself 
43. I tried to avoid thinking about the problem 
44. I thought of something good that will come from the problem situation 
45. I created a specific plan of action for solving the problem 
46. I worked hard to solve the problem 
47. I asked questions about the problem 
48. I hoped for the best 
49. I accepted responsibility for the problem 
50. I talked to a professor/supervisor for emotional support 
51. I blamed others for the problem 
52. I talked to someone about my feelings 
53. I blamed myself for the problem 
54. I got angry about the problem 
55. I talked to another student for specific advice on how to solve the problem 
56. I accepted that I can’t do anything about the problem 
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Appendix C 
Adolescent Invulnerability Scale (AIS) 
How well do the following statements describe you? Rate each statement below: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1.I’m unlikely to be injured in an accident. 
2. My feelings don’t get hurt. 
3. Nothing bad will happen to me when I go to a place by myself. 
4. Nothing seems to bother me. 
5. There are times when I think I am indestructible 
6. I could probably drink and drive without getting into an accident. 
7. My feelings are easily hurt. 
8. I’m unlikely to get hurt if I did a dangerous thing. 
9. I’m a fragile person. 
10. Special problems, like getting an illness or disease, are not likely to happen to me. 
11. Nothing can harm me. 
12. The problems that happen to people my age are unlikely to happen to me. 
13. The opinions of other people just don’t bother me. 
14. What people say about me has no effect on me at all. 
15. Driving very fast wouldn’t be dangerous if I were driving. 
16. I feel very badly when I know there is gossip about me. 
17. Taking safety precautions is far more important for other people than it is for me. 
18. Safety rules do not apply to me. 
19. It is just impossible for people to hurt my feelings. 
20. It is not necessary for me to worry about being injured or harmed. 
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Appendix D 
Academic Success Inventory for College Students (ASICS). 
When responding the statements below, think about one class that has been the hardest or 
most difficult for you within the past year. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Agree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
1.I studied a lot for this class 
2. The instructor really motivated me to do well 
3. I am certain about what occupation I want after I graduate 
4. I need to do well to get a good job later on 
5. I was able to pick out the main, important ideas in lectures and on tests 
6. Personal problems kept me from doing well 
7. It was easy to keep my mind from wandering 
8. Sometimes I partied when I should have been studying 
9. I got satisfaction from learning new material 
10. I was nervous for tests even when I was well prepared 
11. I tried everything I could to do well in this class 
12. I was disappointed in the quality of the instructor 
13. I know what I want to do after I graduate 
14. This class is important to my future success 
15. I felt confident I could understand even the most difficult material 
16. I would have done much better if I didn't have to deal with other problems in my life 
17. I had an easy time concentrating 
18. My grades suffered because of my active social life 
19. I enjoyed the challenge of just learning for learning's sake 
20. Studying for this class made me anxious 
21. I worked really hard in this class 
22. I did poorly because the instructor was not effective 
23. I am certain that my major is a good fit for me 
24. In the future I will use the material I learned in this class 
25. I was pretty sure I could get an A or a B 
26. I had some personal difficulties that affected my performance 
27. I paid attention in this class 
28. I got behind because I spent too much time partying or hanging out with friends 
29. I worked hard because I wanted to understand the material 
30. I got anxious when taking tests in this class 
31. I kept on a good schedule in this class 
32. What I learned I learned on my own 
33. I'm having a hard time choosing a major 
34. This class will be very useful to me in my career 
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35. I knew that if I worked hard I could do well 
36. I had a hard time concentrating 
37. Sometimes my drinking behaviour interfered with my studying 
38. This class was very interesting to me 
39. I made good use of tools, such as planners, calendars and/or organizers 
40. I would have done better if the instructor were better 
41. I was pretty sure I would get a good grade. 
42. I got easily distracted in this class 
43. I skipped this class a lot 
44. I enjoyed attending lectures in this class 
45. I used goal setting as a strategy in this class 
46. I felt pretty confident in my skills and abilities 
47. This class was very boring to me 
48. I was good at setting specific homework goals 
49. I was organized 
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Appendix E 
Expectancy Flexibility Scale (Study 4) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.  
2. There are times when I choose to be optimistic. 
3. I am optimistic some of the time. 
4. I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.  
5. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well. 
6. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.  
7. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my control.  
8. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism. 
9. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic. 
10. I try to hope for the best but prepare for the worst. 
11. I am usually optimistic unless the potential ‘downside’ is relatively likely or serious. 
12. I adjust my expectations for the future in order to cope with the situation. 
13. I try to think about all possible outcomes when I think about the future. 
14. When thinking about the future, I try to be as realistic as possible. 
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Appendix F 
Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ) 
Read each of the following statements carefully. Rate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with each statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Agree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
1.I think of gambling as a challenge 
2. My knowledge and skill in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make 
money 
3. My choices or actions affect the game on which I am betting 
4. If I am gambling and losing, I should continue because I don’t want to miss a win 
5. I should keep track of previous winning bets so that I can figure out how I should bet 
in the future 
6. When I am gambling, “near misses” or times when I almost win remind me that if I 
keep playing I will win 
7. Gambling is more than just luck. 
8. My gambling wins are evidence that I have skill and knowledge related to gambling 
9. I have a “lucky” technique that I use when I gamble 
10. In the long run, I will win more money than I will lose gambling 
11. Even though I may be losing with my gambling strategy or plan, I must maintain that 
strategy or plan because I know it will eventually come through for me 
12. There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain 
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) which 
increase the chances that I will win 
13. If I lose money gambling, I should try to win it back. 
14. Those who don’t gamble much don’t understand that gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to invest some money 
15. Where I get money to gamble doesn’t matter because I will win and pay it back 
16. I am pretty accurate at predicting when a “win” will occur 
17. Gambling is the best way for me to experience excitement. 
18. If I continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money 
19. I have more skills and knowledge related to gambling than most people who gamble 
20. When I lose at gambling, my losses are not as bad if I don’t tell my loved ones 
21. I should keep the same bet even when it hasn’t come up lately because it is bound to 
win 
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Appendix G 
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R) 
Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout.  Try not to let your response to 
one statement influence your responses to other statements.  There are no "correct" or 
"incorrect" answers.  Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think 
"most people" would answer. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1.In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.  
2. It's easy for me to relax.  
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.  
4. I'm always optimistic about my future.  
5. I enjoy my friends a lot. 
6. It's important for me to keep busy.  
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.  
8. I don't get upset too easily.  
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me.  
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. 
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Appendix H 
Multidimensional Health Behavior Inventory (MHBI) 
The following statements describe a broad range of health-related actions or behaviours 
that you may or may not do. Read each statement and indicate how often you do this 
behaviour. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
1.Take time for relaxation every day 
2. Limit red meat in your diet every day 
3. Plan for home fire escape 
4. Limit fat in your diet every day 
5. Check your home for safety 
6. Eat red meat more than two times a week 
7. Eat fewer calories to lose weight 
8. Use biodegradable cleaning products 
9. Ask for help from friends when you are in need 
10. Avoid being exposed to second hand smoke (someone else smoking at home or at 
work) 
11. Eat at least one serving or more of red meat on most days (including beef, pork, ham, 
bacon, lamb, liver and lunch meat not made from poultry). 
12. Use drugs to get high or feel better 
13. Test home smoke detector every month 
14. Recycle newspaper, glass, and/or other products 
15. Discuss problems/concerns with someone close to you 
16. Limit sugar in your diet every day 
17. Take part in social groups, functions, or classes 
18. Eat non-fat or low-fat dairy products 
19. Do something good for yourself every day 
20. Choose foods with whole grains every day, for example, whole wheat bread instead 
of white, brown rice instead of white, etc. 
21. Check your cholesterol level at least once a year 
22. Seek health information 
23. Get adequate sleep every day 
24. Check your blood pressure at least twice a year 
25. Read food and medicine labels before purchasing or consuming the product 
26. Question your health care provider or seek a second opinion 
27. Maintain a first aid kit 
28. Get 7-8 hours sleep every day 
29. Praise people easily 
30. Spend time with close friends 
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31. Participate in recreational physical activities as walking, biking, dancing or sports 
regularly at least twice a week 
32. Limit salt in your diet every day 
33. Smoke cigarettes every day 
34. Drink 5 or more alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, wine coolers, or hard liquor) on one 
occasion. 
35. Check condition of equipment (Household, recreational, automotive) regularly 
36. Limit intake of "sweets" in your diet 
37. Do stretching exercises every day 
38. Fix things as needed 
39. Obtain a regular health check-up when you are not sick 
40. Avoid using tobacco products (cigarettes, cigars, pipe chewing tobacco, or snuff) 
41. Control stress in your life. 
42. Exercise vigorously for at least 20 minutes 3 times a week 
43. Keep daily stress levels low 
44. Avoid drinking and driving 
45. Increase your physical activity to lose weight 
46. Run, jog, or swim for exercise at least 3 times per week 
47. Drink one or more alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, wine coolers, or hard liquor) 
every day 
48. Use touch appropriately (hold someone's hand or give someone a hug). 
49. Discuss health concerns with health resource person 
50. Report unusual or persistent symptoms to a health care provider 
51. Drink alcohol and take medications at the same time 
52. Limit your intake of alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, wine coolers, or hard liquor). 
53. Keep emergency numbers by the telephone (poison control, rescue squad, fire 
department) 
54. Participate in health care programs (health education, health fair, screening). 
55. Eat at least one or more servings of the following items every day: chips, candy bars, 
cake, donuts, pastries, muffins, cookies, ice cream, pudding, chocolate 
56. Drink alcohol and drive 
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Appendix I 
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) 
 Thinking about the last 12 months… 
0 1 2 3 
Never Sometimes Often Most of the time 
 
1.Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose? 
2. Still thinking about the last 12 months, have you needed to gamble with larger 
amounts of money to get the same feeling of excitement? 
3. When you gambled, did you go back another day to try to win back the money you 
lost? 
4. Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble? 
5. Have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling? 
6. Has gambling caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety? 
7. Have people criticized your betting or told you that you had a gambling problem, 
regardless of whether or not you thought it was true? 
8. Has your gambling caused any financial problems for you or your household? 
9. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble? 
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Appendix J 
Demographics 
What is your gender?_____________________ 
What is your age?_________________ 
To what racial or ethnic group do you belong? 
White/ European 
Black/ African/ Caribbean 
Latin/ South American 
East Asian/ Chinese/ Japanese 
South Asian/ Indian/ Pakistani 
Aboriginal/ Metis/ First Nations 
Middle Eastern 
Bi/ Multiracial (please specify)  ______________________ 
Other (please specify)  ______________________ 
 
Year of Study 
1st year 
2nd year 
3rd year 
4th year 
5th year and beyond 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your participation is very valuable to us! 
To receive your Psychology Participant Pool bonus point, please check the box below 
and click SUBMIT. You will be taken to a separate page to enter your name, so that your 
personal information is not connected with your questionnaire responses. The study 
findings will be posted on the REB website at: www.uwindsor.ca/reb/study-results 
        Please take me to the bonus point page 
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